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at 90 l.

ASSASSINATION OF US PRESIDENT J. F. KENNEDY

AND SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS

Moscow

EastLeath

2025

Federal Archival Agency

Russian Historical Society

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Assassination of US President J. F. Kennedy and Soviet-American

relationships. Collection doc. - M.: EastLeath, 2025 - ... with.: ill.

Collection of documents «Assassination of US President J.F. Kennedy and Soviet-American relations» was prepared as part of an ongoing project to publish Russian State archive of the modern history of documents from the «Cold War» period. Central place in the collection the topic related to the reaction of the Soviet side to the murder of J.F. took up. Kennedy and the beginning interactions with the new US President L. Johnson. For the first time on a strictly documentary the basis shows the active assistance of the Soviet authorities in investigating this crime. The book includes documents from the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, recently transferred for storage in the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, as well as materials identified in federal (GA RF, RGASPI, RGAKFFD) and departmental (archive of the SVR RF, archive of the FSB of the Russian Federation, archive of the KGB of the Republic of Belarus) archives. The publication is intended both for specialists and for everyone interested in questions modern history of Russia. General sponsor of the publication PJSC «Transneft»

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Signal instance

Introduction to published documents

Assassination of US President J.F. Kennedy is one of the second loud sensations half of the twentieth century. An incessant flow of journalistic works, journalistic investigations, documentaries and feature films once again confirm that interest in this event continues and will continue to continue for many years. This topic it is actively used not only for conspiracy purposes to stir up attention audience, make a name and money from this, but also in political interests. Recent decree D. Trump, Jan. 23, 2025 #14176 on the release of classified material related to with the assassination of the 35th President of the United States, it is largely connected with the internal political struggle in this the country, raising questions about the permissiveness and lack of control of its special services. The topic of Kennedy's assassination has long been firmly established in scientific historiography. Her not a single serious researcher of Soviet-American relations has escaped modern times. Scientists paid special attention to the causes and consequences of the Caribbean the missile crisis, as well as the history of the preparation and signing of the Moscow Treaty of 1963.' It is worth noting that the literature mainly describes the position of the United States, since the main have American documents been in the public domain at the US National Archives for a long time? and at the Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum in Boston. Soviet documents for the most part, they remained inaccessible for a long time. For position analysis Moscow were used mainly memoirs of Soviet diplomats and statesmen, as well as the son of N.S. Khrushchev - Sergei*, who, like everyone else documents of personal origin could not replace official documents. Thanks to recent publications of a three-volume collection of documents from the Presidium of the Central Committee CPSU, prepared by the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History

- This topic has been repeatedly covered in the works of domestic and foreign scientists. From research recently, publications deserve special attention: Fursenko A.A., Naftali T. Crazy risk: the Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 M, 2016; A.k.a. «Cold War» Khrushchev: secret the history of America's enemy. M., 2018.

2See: The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection//<https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk>
3See: Archival Collections // <https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/about-archival-collections>
* Dobrynin L.F. Purely trusting. Ambassador to Washington under six U.S. Presidents (1962 - 1986). M, 1996; Troyanovsky O.A. Through years and distances. The story of one family. M., 1997; Khrushchev S.N. Nikita Khrushchev: The birth of a superpower. M., 2010.
5 Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. 1954 - 1964. Draft minutes of meetings. Transcripts. Resolutions. In 3 t. 1954 - 1958 Rep. comp. V.YU. Afiani. M, 2006

Signal instance

(ORGANI), as well as a catalog exhibited at the exhibition about the Cuban Missile Crisis materials®, this deficiency has been largely made up for.

This collection presents documents covering Soviet-American relations from the second half of 1963 to the beginning of 1964 The central theme of the publication is reaction of the Soviet leadership to the murder of J.F. Kennedy, helping the Americans in his investigation, establishing contacts with the new administration of President L. Johnson. The short period by historical standards became a kind of thaw in the coming period after the end of World War II, the Cold War, the time when it dawned hope for overcoming it and real cooperation between the two world superpowers.

The Cuban missile crisis became a turning point in the history of relations between the USSR and the USA. Finding themselves on the verge of a deadly nuclear war, the leaders of both states we realized that in order to survive and survive, it is necessary to negotiate. From December In 1962, dialogue on restricting use resumed between Moscow and Washington weapons of mass destruction, which began intermittently in the late 1950s. This led to the fact that at the beginning of 1963 it became more active at the level of experts and diplomats

the process of preparing and signing the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, later becoming known as Moscow Treaty. At the same time, at the initiative of the Soviet side, a discussion began the issue of concluding a Non-Aggression Pact between NATO and the Warsaw Organization treaty, the discussion continued on German and other issues.

JF. Kennedy spoke to American graduates on June 10, 1963

university in Washington with the famous speech «Peace Strategy». It shows the President of the United States he publicly announced the White House's plans to limit nuclear weapons, a lot of attention he devoted himself to the problems of peaceful coexistence with the USSR. He called for a reconsideration of attitudes

to the Soviet Union, he proposed «to greet the Russian people for their numerous achievements - in science and space, in economic and industrial growth, in the field of culture and acts of courage» and recalled that «no country in history the war did not suffer more than the Russian country suffered during World War II».

In addition, Kennedy stated the need to pay more attention to human rights:

6 Cuban Missile Crisis. 60 years later. Comp.: Permyakov I.A, Jalilov T.A, Kradetskaya S.V., Prozumenshchikov M.Yu.

M, 2023.

2

Signal instance

«The right to live one's own life without fear of destruction, the right to breathe air, how does nature give it to us, the rights of future generations to a healthy existence?».

Soviet leaders, Khrushchev personally, reacted positively to the speech

Kennedy. The president's speech was published almost in full in «Pravda» already 13 June

1963, and on June 15, «an interview» was published in «Pravda» and «Izvestia»

with Khrushchev - the Soviet leader's response to the speech of the American president®

Preparations for the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty accelerated sharply. July 26

US Deputy Secretary of State U.A. arrived in Moscow. Harriman, who was received by Khrushchev.

On August 5, US Secretary of State D. Rusk arrived in the Soviet Union to sign the treaty

and British Foreign Secretary A. Douglas-Home. After signing the contract

Rusk toured the country, meeting Khrushchev again in Gagra, where during the

discussions raised a wide variety of problems - from German and Vietnamese

and Lao issues before cooperation between the two countries in space, nuclear, medical, etc chemical-technological and other areas.

The success of the Moscow Treaty encouraged Soviet leaders. Khrushchev

in a confidential message, Kennedy called on him on August 17, 1963

«not to stop there, but to take further steps from what we have taken

have a good start». «Of course, the road ahead of us is not an easy one. However, we must follow it persistently and persistently, walk, albeit slowly, but also without slowing down, consistently

seeking a solution to pressing international problems, which again would respond

the interests not only of our two countries, but of the whole world», Khrushchev wrote°.

The continuation of close contacts between the superpowers was the trip of A.A. Gromyko on regular session of the UN in New York. In September - October 1963, Minister of Foreign Affairs

USSR Affairs held a record 11 meetings with J.F. Kennedy, D. Rusk, and A. Douglas-Home.

During the conversations, issues of a peaceful settlement of the German issue were again raised

non-aggression against Cuba. But most of all, steps towards further disarmament were discussed

reducing military spending, signing a Non-Aggression Pact between countries

Warsaw Pact and NATO.

Since the presidential election campaign began in the United States, the American

after the signing of the Moscow Treaty, the administration did not strive to do anything

'True. 1963 - 13 June.

8 See doc. No. 1.

° See doc. No. 6.

Signal instance

major steps in relations with the USSR, especially if this required a solution US Congress. Individual issues (for example, the Non-Aggression Pact) are Americans diplomatically offered to discuss later, others not through the US Congress, and the resolution of the UN General Assembly. That is how the US President proposed to approve the Treaty on the prohibition of the deployment of nuclear weapons in the space sector.

At the same time, Gromyko's meetings and conversations demonstrated that they were American leaders would like to continue to maintain and develop a trusting dialogue with Soviet leaders on preventing a potential nuclear war, and also across the entire spectrum of bilateral relations. This was reflected in an analytical note by the Soviet Ambassador in Washington A.F. Dobrynin, directed to Moscow literally a month before Kennedy's assassination. It emphasized that the relationship The USSR and the USA are going through «a new period». The ambassador believed that in their formation it is necessary to take into account the difficult internal situation in America, «influence the highly reactionary forces » and danger of international complications associated with «the threat of US interference in the internal affairs of other countries» what's in «improving US-Soviet relations and resolving controversial international ones there is no need to rush into problems, [...] we need to move in this direction step by step carefully considering and dispersing over time the steps taken, as well as trying, whenever possible, to give the agreements reached a form that would not require ratification of such agreements by the US Senate» 10.

In turn, the Soviet leader was impressed by what he was able to establish informal, personal contacts with the American President. In conversations with Khrushchev's son he said that he needed another six years to establish a normal relationship with America." However, this encouraging course of events was interrupted on November 22, 1963. shots fired in Dallas.

Dobrynin was the first to learn about the assassination attempt on Kennedy. In his memories he he reported that he heard about the events in Dallas on the radio while visiting a dentist!2. Putting it aside the sealing procedure, Dobrynin immediately returned to the Soviet embassy and from there contacted Moscow. Taking into account the time difference, an oral message from the ambassador to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs

10 See doc. No. 9.

11 Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev... P. 540.

12 Dobrynin. Purely trusting... P. 95 - 96.

4

Signal instance

was received between 19 and 20 hours. By this time, Gromyko was already at home, from where he immediately contacted Khrushchev.

The Soviet leader was in his mansion on the Lenin Hills that evening. By according to the memories of his son Sergei, Khrushchev returned from Kyiv the day before and was preparing to the next plenum of the Central Committee and «allowed himself to rest a little». When the call came government Communications from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Khrushchev «finished reading the evening mail and was going to his second floor» 13

Sergei Khrushchev wrote that his father was only informed about the assassination attempt on Kennedy. It remained unclear whether the US President was alive. The First Secretary of the Central Committee instructed Gromyko

contact the Ambassador, referring to the US Ambassador, and clarify the details. During the conversation it happened

a small misunderstanding, the minister considered that it was necessary to contact the Soviet ambassador in Washington, and sent a request there. Only an hour later the misunderstanding became clear 4.

As soon as he received the first information about the assassination attempt, Khrushchev's face froze bitter expression». When Nikita Sergeevich shared the news with his family, «hung painful silence», and Khrushchev himself, waiting for a new call from Gromyko, circled around

a room near a table and three chairs. An hour later, Khrushchev himself called Gromyko and he demanded to immediately contact F. Kohler, the US Ambassador to Moscow. Finally, the Soviet leader learned of Kennedy's death and that L. Johnson became the new president. Without hanging up, Khrushchev discussed with Gromyko the text of condolences and the possible participation of the Soviet representative in the funeral ceremony. The minister replied that it was Soviet The Union may be represented at the funeral by an ambassador, but proposed his candidacy, citing to set a precedent - in May 1959, he officially went to the funeral of the Secretary of State USA J. Dulles. Khrushchev objected, saying that «the president should be buried by the president» 15. Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR L.I. Brezhnev, who borrowed for that at the moment, this highest government post did not have sufficient international experience and not quite suitable for such a mission. The Soviet leader offered to send A.I. Mikoyan - First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and member of the Presidium of the Central Committee

The CPSU, which has repeatedly carried out special tasks of the Kremlin, which is closest to Khrushchev a man who has also been to America several times. Except for the official ones khrushchev proposed sending condolences to the new president L. Johnson

13 Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev... P. 538.

14 Troyanovsky. Through years and distances... P. 258.

15 Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev... P. 538.

5

Signal instance

condolences to Kennedy's widow Jacqueline, both on her own behalf and on her own spouses, which was a new word in Soviet diplomatic protocol.

While mourning texts were being prepared in Moscow at night, the Soviet embassy in Washington, she sent condolences to Jacqueline Kennedy, the president's brother Robert Kennedy and D. Rask. Dobrynin expected further instructions from the Center when at 4 p.m., the Associated Press news agency reported the arrest suspicion of Kennedy assassination L.H. Oswald is a former military man and supporter communist Cuba, who previously lived in the USSR and was married to a Soviet citizen. This message extremely worried Dobrynin. Later in his memoirs he wrote:

«The situation began to take on an alarming character, as the question arose about Soviet involvement in events related to the Kennedy assassination. Everyone still had it the memory of the Cuban crisis is fresh. Anti-Soviet sentiment could flare up again with renewed vigor. Potentially, we could be talking about a new serious conflict. All these anxious thoughts haunted me. Of course, I was sure we weren't involved in this drama. However, I had serious concerns that ours the intelligence services could have some connections with Oswald»16.

Concerned about this news, Dobrynin held an operational meeting with the head of the Soviet station in Washington. The latter confirmed that none connections of the KGB or GRU with L.Kh. They didn't have Oswald. Surviving correspondence lee Harvey was handled by regular mail and, most likely, is already known to US authorities.

The only strange thing was Oswald's last letter to the Soviet embassy dated November 9, 1963, but ended up in the hands of Soviet diplomats only 18 November. The message was printed, not written, like all other Oswald letters and it contained a number of incomprehensible points. In the letter, Lee Harvey said that while he was in Mexico, he contacted the Soviet embassy and Cuban consulate with a request he and his family were granted visas to visit the USSR and Cuba, but were refused. Oswald he wrote about surveillance by the FBI, as well as about an offer from one of his federal agents wife Marina «to betray» the Soviet Union and remain under US protection. KGB resident in the USA, the person who sent the translation of this letter by encrypted telegram to Moscow considered the document fake and provocation!?

16 Dobrynin. Purely trusting... P. 96.

17 See doc. No. 23.

Signal exeminary

Dobrynin immediately sent two encryptions to Moscow that contained the following suggestions. First, hand it over to the American authorities, in case of appeal on their part, all the correspondence with Oswald. Secondly, send it to the Soviet leadership official condolences to Washington and visit the residence of the American ambassador in Moscow. These steps, according to Dobrynin, were supposed to help resist hysteria growing in the American media due to possible connections Oswald «with far-left elements»!¹⁸.

The encryptions hit the table of the Soviet leadership at 7:30 a.m. and 8 a.m. 30 minutes in the morning on November 23. By this time, the central office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had already prepared

draft texts with condolences and resolutions of the Central Committee on Mikoyan's trip to the USA. Members of the

The Presidium of the Central Committee promptly approved the documents through a survey'. Regarding the trip

it is necessary to pay attention to an interesting detail - it was not the Soviet one who went to the funeral a delegation, and one Mikoyan, but accompanied. They were supposed to fly to America with him head of the US Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs M.N. Smirnovsky, Mikoyan's assistant V.V. Smolyachenko, translator V.M. Sukhodrev, as well as security guards.

After the adoption of the resolutions of the Central Committee, between 11 and 12 noon Khrushchev accompanied by Gromyko and Sukhodrev, he went to the American embassy to give tribute to the late US President. During a short conversation with the ambassador F. Kohler, the Soviet leader not only announced that he would go to Washington for the funeral Mikoyan, but also asked about the arrest of the killer. Kohler limited himself to the abstract information - he did not name his last name, he only mentioned that he was a former madman the Marine, adding that his exact guilt has not yet been established. Khrushchev, probably expecting that the Ambassador will speak about the leftist views of L.Kh. Oswald, came forward with «the preparation», stated that the party

the communists have always been against the methods of terror and even cited those attributed to Lenin the phrase he allegedly said in 1887 after the execution of his older brother Alexander: «We will go in another way»²⁰. The reference to Lenin served as proof that the communists were advocating for the methods of political struggle and were against the physical elimination of competitors.

¹⁸ See doc. No. 12 and 13.

¹⁹ See doc. No. 17 and 19.

²⁰ According to the recollections of Lenin's sister Maria Ulyanova, Vladimir Ilyich said the following: «No, we will go

not this way. This is not the path we should take». The phrase «We will take a different path» has spread after the publication of V.V.'s poem in 1924. Mayakovsky «Vladimir Ilyich Lenin».

Signal instance

This statement by Khrushchev showed that Kennedy's death caused a serious one concern in the Kremlin, as it could potentially turn into a big problem. Therefore it became important to understand who L.H. was. Oswald and what he did in the Soviet Union.

O.A. Troyanovsky recalled that on the morning of November 23 he called the KGB chairman under the Council of Ministers of the USSR V.E. Semichastny asked what information the intelligence services have information about the killer. «It seemed that Semichastny was expecting this question. He

he immediately replied that he had read reports about Oswald's arrest and had already given instructions to collect it

information about him. Soon he called me and stated that, according to the information he had,

The KGB never had any contact with Oswald», wrote Khrushchev's assistant?!

Probably at the same time Troyanovsky, referring to Khrushchev's oral order, asked

prepare a memo about Oswald, which was sent on the same day Gromyko, to the CPSU Central Committee and to Mikoyan's secretariat in the Council of Ministers². Semichastny in his interviews with the Swedish researcher T. Sniegón, later published in the form of memoirs, he declared the absence of «a trace of Moscow» in the Kennedy assassination. There were simply no motives - he said: «I can't imagine so that any of the Soviet leaders could take responsibility for the death of the highest American statesman and for those catastrophic consequences which for us and for the whole world would mean revealing such a relationship. And what would have we achieved this? Nothing but the very fact of the politician's dirty elimination with whom, unlike others, it was possible to negotiate, the person we are against although they fought in propaganda ways, they both valued and respected more than his competitors. The American public has made a similar attempt on we would demonstrate not the strength of the country's highest representative, but only our own the dullness as well as the ruthlessness of the system which, after 1956, mapped out its path towards the humanization of life and identified it as her main goal. In any case, the course of events would turn against us»²³.

While materials about L.Kh. were being collected in Moscow. Oswald and prepared Mikoyan's trip a real campaign has been launched in the United States to identify and expose the international communist conspiracy. Oswald was given various pro-Soviet labels.

At some point, Dobrynin even advised Moscow «to express ours to the US government
21 Troyanovsky. Through years and distances...S. 259.

22 See doc. No. 26.

23 Semichastny V.E. Restless heart. M, 2002. P. 332.

8

Signal exemplar

concern » about media coverage of Soviet-American relations or make an independent statement to «neutralize or bring down the current one a dangerous direction of American propaganda»²⁴. As another important step, emphasizing the friendly attitude of the Soviet Union, the ambassador recommended conveying with Mikoyan, a personal confidential message to L. Johnson from Khrushchev, in which hope was expressed for maintaining and developing contacts between the two countries. In Washington, the murder shocked the president's inner circle so much that it couldn't come to its senses for a long time. American artist W. Walton, close to the clan Kennedy later said that the first day after the murder was actually the country it was led by the Presidential Adviser on National Security Affairs, M. Bundy.²⁵

Rumors circulated about impending resignations in the US Presidential Cabinet. Dobrynin, he analyzed various news and reported to Moscow what was in all these rumors there is a certain element of exaggeration and speculation. «Johnson won't especially to rush into mass displacement so as not to cause widespread discontent in the Democratic Party itself, especially on the eve of elections» - rightly so summarized by the Soviet ambassador?⁶,

The top American leadership was aware of the need to preserve business relations with the USSR. Secretary of State D. Rusk played a big role in this. Already in the evening On November 23, the State Department released the first official statement about the non-involvement of the Soviet Union

Union, Cuba or any other country to the assassination of the US President. Probably exactly Rusk on November 24, through L. Thompson, conveyed Khrushchev's visit to the American the embassy, as well as the decision to send Mikoyan to the funeral, is assessed by the American one the management is very positive. All this was supposed to bring down anti-Soviet statements in the American press?. However, Thompson was forced to ask the Soviet press in turn, she stopped focusing on the role of far-right circles in the murder Kennedy?⁸. Thompson made general recommendations for Mikoyan's trip: Soviet

24 See doc. No. 20.

25 See doc. No. 63.

26 See doc. No. 24.

27 White House Press Secretary P. Salinger on November 26 in a conversation with Sukhodrev «with great sincerity

and with excitement» he said that Khrushchev's visit to the American embassy was «great and very a good impression on all White House staff who knew Kennedy intimately» (see Doc. #45).

28 It must be said that Moscow listened to these recommendations. Members of the Presidium of the Central Committee were removed on November 25

from consideration, a draft resolution prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the KGB on reports in the Soviet press

exposing speculation in the American press.

Signal instance

the representative was asked to refuse interviews with the press and speeches on television

they also advised not to stay in America for long after the funeral²⁹.

Mikoyan arrived in Washington on November 24 and settled in the embassy building.

Dobrynin familiarized himself with the materials sent from the State Department, in particular the list representatives of foreign countries participating in the funeral and with ceremony

farewell to the late President³. Translator V.M. Sukhodrev in his memoirs

he wrote that there were instructions about the uniform. The fact is that from the second third of the 19th century.

in England and the USA, men wore a business card - a black frock coat - to mourning events

with rounded floors radiating from the front. «Throughout all its previous practice

I knew that our leaders had neither tuxedos nor tailcoats. What was mine

surprise when Mikoyan suddenly announced that he had brought with him "some kind of jacket with long ones "by the sexes"», wrote the translator,³. It turned out that Mikoyan wore this suit when he was on

inauguration of the President of Pakistan. Mikoyan's escorts were going to Washington

hastily, without enough time. The same Sukhodrev recalled that he flew to the USA

in a light coat, which «in color did not quite suit this occasion» ³². Bailed him out

one of the embassy employees who borrowed a dark blue coat.

Monday, November 25, was declared a day of mourning throughout the United States.

On this day at 11 a.m., the farewell ceremony for Kennedy began. Tightly

a closed polished wood coffin containing the President's body was moved from the Rotunda

Capitol, where ordinary Americans said goodbye to their leader, to the White territory

At home. From here the motorcade under the command of the commander of the military district in

Washington, General

major F. Will, with a company of drummers and marines and a carriage with a coffin,

drawn by two light stallions in apples, he moved towards St. Brand.

A funeral procession followed the motorcade: widow, close relatives, president

L. Johnson,

•high-ranking foreign and American

state

and public figures. Kennedy's funeral service took place in the cathedral, after which the body of the deceased took place

both Robert and Jacqueline were taken to Arlington Cemetery, where the burial took place

they lit an eternal flame on the grave.

After the cemetery, all the guests gathered in the banquet hall of the White House. It was

Kennedy's widow's last official reception. Jacqueline only appeared at the end; that's it

²⁹ See doc. No. 32.

³⁰ See doc. No. 33.

³¹ Sukhodrev V.M. My tongue is my friend. M, 2008. P. 172.

³² Ibid.

10

Signal instance

those present approached her and shook hands with some of her

she said a few words. Mikoyan received information in advance to him one of the last or even the very last to approach. When Anastas Ivanovich Dobrynin and I approached the widow, the latter «with great feeling and barely restraining sobbing» said: «I am sure that Chairman Khrushchev and my husband could achieve success in search of peace, and they really strived for it. Now you must continue this the point and bring it to the end». Jacqueline said this «with inspiration and excitement», holding it Mikoyan's hand with his own hands, «trying to convey his feelings as convincingly as possible and thoughts regarding the cause of peace, to which her husband devoted his efforts, and his desire so that our countries complete the work they started»³³. All this undoubtedly touched such an experienced person politics like Mikoyan.

After a White House reception with a widow at the State Department for representatives of foreign countries held a short reception with the participation of a new one president of the USA. It was attended by 26 presidents and heads of government 30 foreign ministers, five defense ministers, a dozen reigning families - in total, representatives of 53 states. While waiting for the meeting with Johnson, Mikoyan managed to do it briefly

chat with the new English Prime Minister A. Douglas-Home, President France S. de Gaulle, Prime Minister of Sweden T. Erlander, Emperor of Ethiopia Haile Selassie, President of Israel 3. Shazar and Japanese Prime Minister H. Ikeda.

On Tuesday morning, November 26, Mikoyan and his entourage spent more than a detailed conversation with L. Johnson, in the afternoon with D. Rusk, and in the evening with English Prime Minister A. Douglas-Home and Emperor Haile of Ethiopia Selassie. Dobrynin recalled that Mikoyan went to a conversation with Johnson «with some excitement»⁴. However, everything went well. The President was flattered by the personal Khrushchev sent a confidential message to Mikoyan and conveyed his message to the Soviets to the leader, adding that the letter was the first document he signed by occupying Oval office³⁵. Johnson suggested that similar messages should continue to be exchanged and even, according to Dobrynin's memoirs, he added: «Perhaps we will achieve more than

³³ See doc. No. 35. A.F. Dobrynin in his memoirs conveys Jacqueline's words somewhat differently: «That morning

the day my husband was killed, he suddenly told me at the hotel before breakfast that everything had to be done to

establish good relations with Russia. I don't know what caused these words at that particular moment, but they they sounded like the result of some deep thought. I am sure that Prime Minister Khrushchev and my husband could

achieve success in the search for peace, and they really strived for this. Now both governments must continue this work and bring it to the end» (Dobrynin. Purely trusting... P. 97).

³⁴ Dobrynin. Purely trusting... P. 107.

³⁵ S. doc. No. 38.

11

Signal jumper

under my predecessor»³⁶. Johnson promised that «there will be no Kennedy in politics or changes», stated that the United States would not invade Cuba.³⁷. The conversation turned out to be the most

a long of seven meetings between the new president and foreign delegations in those days, instead of half an hour, it lasted almost an hour. The President spoke warmly and he was friendly and even showed flowers and bushes that Kennedy had personally planted nearby with White House terrace. The meeting showed that the new head of the White House intends to adhere to a pragmatic approach in relations with the USSR.

The meeting with Rusk lasted longer and was sharper. Mikoyan once again he raised the problem of creating multilateral nuclear forces and militarizing the Western one Germany, especially emphasizing that «we are not afraid of the Germans, since we have so many weapons that if war breaks out, we will be able to destroy the Western one on the very first day

Germany. We fear that West Germany could provoke a war in which you will also be involved, and perhaps even against your desires»³⁸. Rusk, in turn, assured Mikoyan that the German government would never will not be able to independently dispose of nuclear weapons a «multilateral nuclear forces will never become the tail that wags the dog» ³⁹. Rusk confirmed Johnson's words about the continuity of foreign policy Kennedy even proposed a joint freeze on military budgets. Already at the beginning of the conversation, he frankly said: «There are, of course, large ones between us disagreements. I don't mean [...] ideological differences that are deep and, perhaps, even an irreconcilable character. After all, N.S. Khrushchev often says that we cannot convince him to become a capitalist just as he cannot convince us to become communists. But in broader terms of interstate relations, we we maintain contacts with each other, although we approach some of the problems from different positions. We believe that it is necessary to continue to study and discuss these problems and that one should not be impatient»⁴⁰.

It is significant that the American press commented favorably on the stay Mikoyan in the USA. R. Kennedy addressed Mikoyan with letters of gratitude. Touching there was a letter from Jacqueline that she wrote to Khrushchev on one of her last nights 36 Dobrynin. Purely trusting... P. 108.

37 See doc. No. 38.

38 See doc. No. 44.

39 See doc. No. 44.

40 See doc. No. 44.

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Signal instance

in the White House⁴¹!. Overall, Mikoyan's mission was completed. November 27 at 16.55 a plane carrying Soviet representatives took off in Eastern Time from Andrews Air Force Base to Moscow.

The positive outcome of Mikoyan's trip to Washington was an important signal moreover, the Presidium of the Central Committee agreed to hand it over to the American side on November 29 photocopies of correspondence with L.Kh. By Oswald, including the mysterious letter of 9 November.⁴² On the the next day the correspondence ended up in the hands of Rusk. The transfer took place on time because the day before, Johnson's decision formed the Presidential Commission of Inquiry assassinations of US President J.F. Kennedy, better known as the «Warren Commission», by named after the authoritative American lawyer who headed it, Chairman of the Supreme US ships by E. Warren.

Information about the transfer of correspondence with L.Kh. Oswald pretty quickly spread through official and unofficial channels. So, in a few hours after meeting with Rusk at a reception with the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, G. Seaborg in honor of the Chairman of the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for the Use of Atomic Energy A.M. Petrosyants, Dobrynin spoke with L. Thompson. The latter is not only he thanked him for handing over the documents, but also said that one of the journalists «somehow inexplicably» learned of the transfer of photocopies to the State Department.⁴³ Dobrynin yet returning from reception, and in the first issue of the Sunday issue «Washington Post» (edition it came out late on Saturday evening) a meeting of the Soviet ambassador was reported with Rusk and the transfer of photocopies of correspondence with L.H. Oswald. The next day this news it made it into all American newspapers. The American press commented on this message positively. A number of newspapers indicated that US officials had stopped tying up Oswald with the Soviet Union.

The transfer of correspondence was an important step by the Soviet side in providing assistance in the Kennedy assassination investigation. Already on December 10, 1963, members of the Presidium of the Central Committee

they supported Gromyko's proposal to inform Rusk about the reasons for the refusal of the Soviet authorities to accept Oswald as a Soviet citizen.⁴⁴ On 23 April 1964, responding to a request from Rusk

and E. Warren, the Americans were given copies of L.H.'s personal documents. Oswald his time stays in the USSR, which included: materials about residence and employment, about leaving

41 See doc. NO. 60

42 See doc. No. 52.

43 See doc. No. 57.

44 See doc. No. 64.

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Signal instance

Soviet Union, medical data (in particular, medical history from psychosomatic and surgical departments of the Botkin Hospital and from the Second clinical Hospital of Minsk)⁴⁵. The transfer of all these documents took place confidentially - neither the governments of other countries, nor journalists, nor the mother Oswald, nor even the great friend of the Soviet Union, the English philosopher B. Russell, were there admitted to «the Oswald dossier». Although the transferred materials on Oswald had limited character and did not allow us to form a complete picture of his stay in the USSR, the Americans highly appreciated the very fact of the transfer.

At the same time, since the end of November 1963, in official and semi-official there were a wide variety of versions of Kennedy's assassination in American circles. Chapter washington branch of the newspaper «New York Times» J. Reston in conversation with Dobrynin reported that FBI investigators received personal instructions from L. Johnson to check cuban and Chinese traces*. A stable one was forming among those close to the Kennedy clan the version is that the murder was part of a large political conspiracy, in which it was quite possible people close to Johnson may also have been involved. W. Walton at a confidential meeting in Moscow he stated: «Maybe there was only one killer, but accomplices in the murder there is undoubtedly more President»⁴⁷.

Khrushchev adhered to a similar version. In a conversation with an American journalist D. Pearson in Cairo at the end of May 1964 he said: «This is too much for Lee Oswald's mind a complex crime. A whole group of people acted here according to a pre-developed plan the plan. One person cannot commit such a crime». And he further added: «Behind everything this crime is committed by people who had great opportunities - and material ones and financial. They confuse the whole investigation. It is no coincidence that the murder occurred in Dallas. Kennedy essentially fell victim to his enemies»⁴⁸.

In connection with perpetuating the memory of the late president, the Soviet side she continued to help the Americans. Back on December 5, 1963, two brothers of the deceased president and the president of Harvard University began a campaign to raise funds for construction presidential Memorial Library, and on February 26, 1964, Robert wrote letters

Khrushchev, Gromyko and A.I. Adjubei with a request to give interviews in which they would tell about my impressions of the former president. At the same time, Robert made a reservation that since

45 See doc. No. 71.

46 See doc. No. 58.

47 See doc. No. 63.

48 See doc. No. 72.

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Signal instance

many stories in interviews may have confidential information, then «no one will have access to it - neither scientists, nor government officials, nor congressional commissions neither journalists nor members of the Kennedy family - except on terms that you can wish to bet»⁴⁹. The Soviet leadership responded positively in this case too upon request. By the resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee of June 29, 1964, the library received diplomatic mail a copy of a documentary about the meeting of the two leaders in Vienna and a recording were provided with Khrushchev's speech in the Austrian capital in 1961, as well as individual materials published in the Soviet press So.

Trojanovsky wrote in his memoirs that every American is good in the USA he remembers where he was when the news of Kennedy's assassination came, and added: «I think that this can be said about many Russians»⁵¹. Indeed, ordinary Soviet people the American tragedy was taken quite closely. Talking about the apparent paradoxical of this phenomenon, Dobrynin believed that he played the main role in this the Cuban Missile Crisis that brought the world to the brink of disaster ². His successful outcome on both the ocean sides received it with general relief. For most Soviet ones and the need for American citizens became obvious, despite any ideological and socio-political differences, preventing nuclear war and the world apocalypse.

doctor of History. A.N. Artizov

49 See doc. No. 78.

5° See doc. No. 83.

S! Trojanovsky. Through years and distances... P. 258.

5a Dobrynin. Purely trusting... S. 99 - 100

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Archaeographic preface

Collection of documents «Assassination of US President J.F. Kennedy and Soviet-american Relations» prepared as part of an ongoing project to publish Russian State Archive of Contemporary History of Documents of the Cold Period «wars». The starting point of this project can be considered the preparation and publication under the editorship academician A.A. Fursenko fundamental publication «Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee»' and the beginning of the study

on a new array of historical sources deposited in the activities of the highest party organ, the true history of the confrontation between the two systems after the Second World War?.

The compilers of the collection aimed to reflect on the basis of archival sources one of the difficult periods of Soviet-American relations in the 1960s: recovery after the Cuban Missile Crisis, full trusting contacts at the highest level between leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States of America, tragic death US President John Fitzgerald Kennedy and establishing the first contacts with the new one president Lyndon Johnson.

The central place in the collection was occupied by the topic related to the reaction of the Soviet side to kill J.F. Kennedy and the beginning of interaction with the new US President

L. Johnson. For the first time, active assistance is shown on a strictly documentary basis

soviet authorities are investigating this crime. Selection of documents for inclusion in the collection was carried out primarily taking into account the criterion of their novelty and compliance with the intended purpose of the publication.

Most of the documents were previously in private storage at the Archives

President of the Russian Federation (former archive of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee) and only recently

deposited in the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History. All

the published materials have undergone the established declassification procedure.

The compilers chose the subject-chronological principle of systematization

documents. All of them are grouped into four sections, located inside the sections

in chronological order, but at the same time they have a single end-to-end numbering. Considering that the materials inside the sections are arranged in chronological order

the inevitable partial loss of cause-and-effect relationships between documents

restored in comments (content notes) using cross-references.

The first section of the collection includes documents on Soviet-American relations

the highest level during the start of the election campaign in the United States. They mostly

• Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. 1954-1964. Draft minutes of meetings. Transcripts. Resolutions. In 3 tons - M.: ROSSPEN. 2003-2008.

2 Vienna Waltz of the Cold War (around the meeting N.S. Khrushchev and J. F. Kennedy in 1961 in Vienna).

Documents. - M.: ROSSPEN, 2011; Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. Two colors of time. Documents from personal fonda N.S. Khrushchev. In 2 volumes - M.: MFD, 2009; New world in Europe (USSR, Germany and the Moscow Treaty 1970 according to documents of the Central Committee of the CPSU) - M.: Kuchkovo Pole, 2020,

Signal instance

dedicated to the preparation and conclusion of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in three Wednesdays (Moscow Treaty of 1963), contacts of the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko with the US leadership during his stay at the XVIII General UN Assembly, as well as discussion by the Soviet leadership of the main issues further development of relations with the USA and directly with J.F. Kennedy. In this section 11 documents for the period 13 June to 25 October 1963 included.

The second, main section, includes documents covering somewhat closely related topics are the reaction of the leadership of the Soviet Union to the murder of J.F. Kennedy in Dallas, a trip to the USA to participate in the funeral of N.S.'s trusted associate. Khrushchev - member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers

A.I. Mikoyan, establishing his first contacts with the new president L. Johnson and finally, the USSR provided assistance to the American side in conducting the investigation. This section includes 66 documents for the period 22 November 1963 to 28 September 1964.

The third section is devoted to issues related to the history of the creation of the Presidential Library and the J.F. Museum. Kennedy in Boston and providing documentary material for her acquisition. This section includes 7 documents for the period from February 26 to August 28, 1964.

Finally, the fourth (additional) section includes materials on provision L.H. Oswald has the right to reside in the USSR and about his stay in Minsk. In this section 11 documents for the period 13 October 1959 to 28 May 1962 included.

The basis for the preparation of this collection was the documents deposited in the fund No. 3 «Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP (b) - CPSU» (thematic cases «On the assassination of the President

D.F. Kennedy» and «USA. Political and economic relations» (inventory No. 66 «International Affairs», Subgroup «USA»), Inventory Cases No. 16 «Minutes of meetings Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee (original resolutions and materials). XXII Convocation »), as well as individual documents from N.S.'s personal fund. Khrushchev (Foundation No. 52, Inventory No. 1). The collection also includes a number of documents from other federal and departmental ones archives that complement the complex of sources identified in RGANI.

Materials regarding A.I.'s trip. Mikoyan, stored in the State Archives Russian Federation and in the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. From the archive Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation and the Central Archive of the Federal the Security Service of the Russian Federation has received documents relating to L.H. Oswald. Central Archive of the State Security Committee of the Republic Belarus presented materials about Oswald's stay in Minsk.

Along with the documents, little-known photographic and film documents are published in the collection from the funds of the Russian State Archive of Film, Photo and Sound Documents and the Russian state Archive of Socio-Political History.

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Mostly the original was selected for publication in the collection, and only in exceptional cases, copies were included, usually deposited in thematic cases.

Separately, it is necessary to dwell on the question of authenticity or copy documents received via encrypted communication channels (encryptotelegram). With them admission to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers from a deciphered text at least 4-5 equivalent copies were printed on special forms. At the same time

the deciphered original text, according to the compilers, cannot be determined as the first copy (original) of this type of document.

Documents from departmental archives included in the collection, as a rule presented by excommunications, since the first copies were sent to the addressee. It is also necessary consider that during this period (1961-1964) when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent notes to the CPSU Central Committee with the attachment of draft resolutions to the General Department of the Central Committee at the same time as signed the original (1st copy) also received the second, and sometimes the third copy of the note, which did not have it signatures. This is probably due to the peculiarity of the formation of original resolutions Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee and thematic affairs in sectors I and VI of the General Department of the Central Committee.

Subsequently, according to the compilers, the original notes began to multiply in the General Department of the Central Committee on electrocopiers produced in Czechoslovakia and the GDR.

Published documents can be roughly divided into several species groups.

1. Resolutions of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, adopted both at meetings and during the period

between meetings of the Presidium by poll voting. Precisely by resolutions

The Presidium regulated the main issues related to the topic of the collection. Archived the texts of the resolutions have been preserved in several versions.

In the minutes of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. Based on the results of the meeting of the Presidium*

The general department of the Central Committee prepared a protocol, which included all resolutions (for with the exception of resolutions «Special stick», where only the number was included in the protocol paragraph and title of the resolution (s), as adopted directly at the meeting, so and decisions made by poll voting in the period after the previous meeting.

The protocol was printed in several versions: signature, signed First secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and sometimes together with him, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, presiding over

meeting; archival No. 1, which provided an almost exact copy of the signature protocol, for with the exception of protocol points, used for reference work in the General department of the Central Committee; newsletter intended for distribution to members of the CPSU Central Committee. At the last one

the protocol did not include references to items «Special Folder», as well as most decisions on operational, personnel and other issues made by ministries and departments. Mostly decisions regarding the organization remained for distribution party work or on major national economic issues.

Extracts from the minutes of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. From the adopted resolutions immediately

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extracts were prepared on forms, settled by those responsible for execution, as well sent (in several copies) to the VI sector of the General Department of the Central Committee for formations into thematic cases and subsequent delivery.

Originals of resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee (resolutions of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee).

Draft resolutions were prepared and submitted for consideration by members of the Presidium of the Central Committee

CPSU by the relevant departments of the Central Committee or directly by the ministry/department (usually by the security forces or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). We entered sector 1 of the General Department of the Central Committee, after which

as a rule, they were sent in the form of copies to members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee for voting. After

completion of voting (decision making) in the original draft if necessary handwritten corrections (including editorial corrections) were made. After that the head of the General Department of the Central Committee (sometimes deputy head of the department) was given written indication on the text of the draft on the design, release and distribution of the decision Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. All subsequent records relating to replications and mailings, including the number and date of the resolution, were also affixed to the original. Upon completion of the mailing, original decisions, extracts from the protocol together with the notes and other materials that served as the basis for their adoption they were transferred to sector VI, where they were formed into cases «Minutes of Presidium meetings Central Committee of the CPSU (original resolutions and materials)» and in thematic matters. Whereas, on the originals of the resolutions in the most all stages of preparation, voting and release of the document are reflected in concentrated form the compilers used them as the main source for publication.

2. Official messages from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the President of the USA as well as musical correspondence from the US Embassy.

Messages from N.S. Khrushchev were preserved in two main versions - in the form of a project prepared in the central office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in some cases in its secretariat), and in the final version, approved by a resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee. It is possible distinguish two types of messages: open, that is, published in print, and closed, confidential. If the text of the message was officially published, information about this indicated in the comments.

The messages of the US President have been preserved in two versions - the originals on in English, directly signed by the authors (autographs or certified by facsimile signatures); translations received from the joint embassy or the central one ministry of Foreign Affairs apparatus. All foreign language materials are published in the collection in translations.

3. Recordings of conversations between N.S. Khrushchev and US political and public figures.

4. Documents from ministries and departments formed the main part of the collection. They are possible roughly divided into two groups:

notes from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR and their

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deputies, as well as heads of other government bodies in the CPSU Central Committee; notes from USSR ambassadors to the CPSU Central Committee or the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, transmitted using encryption communication. After receipt and decryption, the cipher telegrams were printed in several copies (since 1964 they have been reproduced using electrocopying (apparatus) and were sent to members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee and other addressees. For the publications, as a rule, were taken from a copy sent by N.S. Khrushchev.

5. Documents of personal origin are represented by letters from Jacqueline and Robert Kennedy, L.H. Oswald. All letters are written in English. Original letters used by the compilers as illustrative material. To personal documents origin is also attributed to the visa application form.

6. Reference and information materials are presented in documents formed as a result of A.I.'s trip. Mikoyan in the USA, prepared by the department USA USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the USSR Embassy in the USA.

Archaeographic processing of published documents was carried out in accordance with the Methodological Guidelines for the Publication of Archival Documents developed by the VNIIDAD in 2022, taking into account the specifics of preparing documents in the highest party bodies. Each document has its own editorial title, number (if available), indication on site, create a document (for those prepared outside Moscow) and date. If the document has

own title, then it is included in the editorial in quotation marks.

All headings indicate the positions of the author and addressee of the document. Exception only the positions of N.S. were compiled. Khrushchev, which are published only in the first document. The compilers did this, taking into account current practice when publishing, do not indicate the positions of top officials of the Soviet Union (I.V. Stalin, N.S. Khrushcheva, L.I. Brezhnev et al.), which is largely due to their combination of a series posts, and the complexity of determining in what capacity he is addressed in a specific one moment. So, notes addressed to N.S. Khrushchev, sent to him as Chairman of the Council Ministers of the USSR, in most cases, were considered by the Presidium of the Central Committee and they were first formalized as resolutions of the Central Committee.

The date set by the drafters is indicated in square brackets.

Classifieds of secrecy on the document, indication of the copy number, etc.

reproduced as part of the document after the editorial title, on the right below the date.

Resolutions, letters, certificates relating to the document, as well as features reproductions of text, various corrections in it, etc. are specified in textual ones notes indicated by a footnote sign in the form of letters of the Latin alphabet. Compilers they considered it possible not to mention various types of documents in them office notes, registration stamps and other insignificant ones in terms of content, the features of the design and movement of documents.

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C. non-nal copy

Documents are published in full, without deletions or abbreviations of the text. The only one the exception is document No. 72 «From the recording of the conversation by N.S. Khrushchev with a columnist newspapers «New York Times» D. Pearson and his wife L. Pearson about the murder investigation JF. Kennedy», which omitted part of the text that was not relevant to the topic of the collection.

When transmitting the text of documents, their stylistic and linguistic features are preserved.

Explicit typos and grammatical errors that have no semantic meaning and do not distort the contents of the document are not specified by the drafters; missing words have been restored in square brackets. The author's underlines in the text are retained, and the underlines, those made in the process of familiarizing themselves with the document are not transferred to the CPSU Central Committee or the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

All foreign surnames and first names are printed, as in documents, their discrepancies

they are not specified or brought to modern spelling. Modern spelling

foreign surnames and given names are given in the name index, where they are indicated in parentheses discrepancies found in documents.

The legend includes an indication of where the document was stored. Moreover, in a number of cases it is reported that there is an original and a release (copy) identified in various archives.

The legend must also indicate the authenticity or copy of the document; way reproduction of text (typewritten text, manuscript, etc.), as well as the presence of signatures autographs. For example: «Typewritten text. Signature autograph, blue ballpoint pen».

The scientific reference apparatus of the collection consists of textual notes comments (notes on content), name and geographical indicators, list abbreviations and list of published documents.

Everything necessary for a more complete and accurate understanding of the contents of the document comments that are explanatory, clarifying or for reference are marked in Arabic numerals and are given after the main corpus of documents.

For commenting, in addition to publicly available sources, of various types reference and memoir literature, periodicals, widely

documentary materials from the former archives of the Politburo and the Secretariat were used and the Office of the CPSU Central Committee, stored in the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History as well as a scientific reference apparatus for them.

The compilers consider it their duty to express gratitude to the GARF employees

L.A. Rogovoy and F.I. Melentyev, RGAKFD - N.I. Pestov and L.A. Denisova, RGASPI -

PP. Skorospelov and N.I. Leontyeva, RGANI - A.E. Sokolova, T.A. Jalilov, A.A. Kazinov

and L.V. Klimova, as well as the former director of the Historical and Documentary Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry

N.M. Barinova and our colleagues from the archives of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia, the FSB of Russia and the KGB of the Republic

Belarus, which provided invaluable assistance in preparing the collection.

A.S. Stepanov, N.Yu. Brewers

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SECTION I

«RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FATE OF THE WORLD LIES WITH THESE TWO LEADERS»

documents on Soviet-American relations at the highest level during the pre-election period
campaigns in the USA

June 13 - October 25, 1963

NO. 1

Note by the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

N.S. Khrushchev to members and candidates for members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, to the secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee about the draft answers to questions from newspaper editors-in-chief

«Truth» and «Izvestia» in connection with the speech of US President J. F. Kennedy
at American University on June 10, 1963.

June 13, 1963 al

MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE KLSS

CANDIDATES FOR MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE

SECRETARIES OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE

I am sending a draft of my answers to questions from newspaper editors-in-chief «Pravda»
and «Izvestia» in connection with the speech of US President J. Kennedy on June 10?.

If there are any comments, please let me know.

N. KHRUSHCHEV

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 294. L.219. Original. Typewritten text.

NO. 2

Resolution of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee «Draft answers vol. Khrushcheva N.S.
to questions from the editors-in-chief of newspapers «Pravda» and «Izvestia»

in connection with the speech of US President J. Kennedy from June 10 this year»

No P7102/33

14 June 1963

Approve the draft answers t. Khrushcheva N.S. to questions from newspaper editors-in-chief «Pravda»
and «Izvestia» in connection with the speech of US President J. Kennedy dated June 10 this year. (attached)?.

• At the bottom of the litter sheet with a blue ballpoint pen «Dictated by N.S. Khrushchev 13.VI.63
O.Troyanovsky».

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(Appendix)

To paragraph 33 of prot [col] No. 102a

STRENGTHEN THE CAUSE OF PEACE, DEVELOP COOPERATION!B

Answers from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N.S. Khrushchev to questions
editors-in-chief of the newspaper «Pravda» and «Izvestia»

US President J. Kennedy spoke at American University on June 10

in Washington with a speech in which he touched on a number of important international issues.

This speech was published in the Soviet press.

The editors-in-chief of the newspapers «Pravda» and «Izvestia» addressed the Chairman of the Council
Ministers of the USSR N.S. Khrushchev with a request to comment on this speech of the US President.

Below are the answers of N.S. Khrushchev.

Question. In his speech, US President J. Kennedy paid special attention to

the problem of war and peace. At the same time, he stated that in our age «total war it makes no sense» that «peace need not be unfeasible, and war doesn't have to be inevitable». He also stated that «as the United States and their allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies are mutually deep interested in a just and genuine peace and an end to the arms race».

How do you assess these statements by the President of the United States?

The answer. Speech by US President J. Kennedy gained attention as in the USA and in other countries of the world, including the Soviet Union. This speech by the President will address the most important issue of our time: about war and peace in conditions when nuclear weapons have become colossal and destructive strength, and stocks of these weapons are constantly increasing.

I think that the Soviet people read the President's introduction with interest USA, since this speech took a step forward in the real assessment of the international the situation* and talks about the need to find ways that would rid humanity of arms races and from the threat of a global thermonuclear war.

The world community, all Soviet people know well that the Soviet government in its foreign policy it has always proceeded from Lenin's principle of peaceful coexistence states with different social systems. Our government contributed specific ones proposals for an end to the arms race, general and complete disarmament, and prohibition and a blue edit has been made to the entire text of the answers ballpoint pen and simple pencil. It takes into account proposals from L.F. Ilyichev and B.N. Ponomarev, as well as, probably, N.S. Khrushchev's assistants. If available data, the compilers specify who the author of the edit is.

in the original version of the title «The word about peace must be supported by practical deeds».

° Initial version «...as this talk takes a step forward in understanding the real assessment assessment of the international situation...».

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Signal instance

nuclear tests, on the creation of nuclear-free zones in various regions of the globe, on the withdrawal of foreign troops from foreign territories, on concluding a peace treaty with Germany and resolving on this basis the issue of West Berlin*, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the member countries of the North Atlantic bloc (NATO) and the participating countries Warsaw Pact.

Many examples could be given of concrete, purposeful the activities of the Soviet government both within the UN and in various commissions committees and subcommittees where practical proposals were made on the named and on to many other controversial and unresolved issues.

President Kennedy's speech emphasizes the real danger to peace, including for the United States of America*, as a result of the arms race accumulation of huge quantities of nuclear weapons. He correctly says that in modern ones under conditions, a world war is especially meaningless, since it will inevitably entail enormous loss of life and destruction of material values created by labor many generations. He also rightly notes that the arms race, if it do not suspend, can lead to a military disaster. Nuclear bombs are not cucumbers which can be stored in a warehouse and kept in a mothballed state for quite a long time. The President's statement that there is a world war also attracts attention in modern conditions it is not inevitable. As you know, this conclusion has long been made by us. From the above it is clear that the speech contains a number of positive aspects indicating a sober consideration of the real situation®.

Reading the speech of the President of the United States, one cannot at the same time pay attention to some contradictory provisions it contains.

The President talks about the need to end «the Cold War». However, the by declaring this, does the US President seek to eliminate the sources «of the Cold War»? From this performance is not visible.

Let's take, for example, one of the most important problems - the issue of concluding German peace treaty.

President Kennedy states: «Our commitment to defend Western Europe and West Berlin, for example, remains unchanged due to the identity of our lives interests. The United States would not make any deal with the Soviet Union to the detriment of to other countries and other peoples, not only because they are our partners, but because they interests and our interests coincide».

a Original text «President Kennedy's speech reveals an understanding of the real threat to peace including the United States of America...». Edit by L.F. Ilyicheva.

- The original text «... that the speech contains a number of positive realistic points.». Edit B.N. Ponomarev.

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It seems that the US government is not seeking to find ways for there is practically no agreed solution to the German problem in this matter old positions, which essentially merge with the position of the most reactionary the aggressive forces of West Germany, led by Adenauer, Brandt and others revanchist people. One of the main sources «of the Cold War», thus, it is not eliminated."

The Soviet government would like to sign the German peace treaty and resolve based on it, the question of West Berlin, together with its former allies in the second world war. As is known from repeated statements by the Soviet government the solution to this issue does not pursue the goals of benefit for one or disadvantage for another parties. From the signing of the German villagethe slander will win the cause of peace as a whole, everyone will win

peoples, including the American people. Soviet proposals on the German question specific and clear. They are based on recognition of the current situation in Europe and Germany - the presence of two sovereign German states: the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.

As for West Berlin specifically, there are no more reasonable and logical ones proposals such as the creation of a free city of West Berlin with corresponding ones guarantees of its international status.

I reaffirm that the Soviet government stands for the strictest international guarantees for the free city of West Berlin with the participation of the UN. Necessary emphasize with all determination that from the conclusion of the German peace treaty - you can't go anywhere. This issue must and will be resolved. We'd rather, so that it is resolved by agreement with the Western powers.

In order to eliminate the sources «of the Cold War», and not only «of the Cold War», but dangerous sources of starting a new world war are needed not just wishes, but concrete actions.

Or take another very important question. The President talks about weakening international tension. But how to combine the existence of American ones with this military bases on foreign territories. After all, it is a fact that the United States surrounded the Soviet Union and other socialist countries with their military bases. They essentially occupied South Vietnam, South Korea, Japan»,

, and a number of other states. Besides, to this day

a day as a result of United States aggression, the ancestral Chinese territory of Taiwan is all still occupied by American troops®. In some countries, American troops

- Original text «It follows that the US government is not going to look for ways to a coordinated solution to the German problem. President Kennedy practically remains on this issue old positions. One of the main sources «of the Cold War» is thus not eliminated. This is the President's statement essentially coincides with the position of the most reactionary aggressive forces in the West

Germany, led by Adenauer, Brandt and other revanchist-minded people».

it is inscribed in the Word «Japan».

25

Signal instance

they practically perform the functions of an international gendarme, conduct military operations, suppressing the national liberation movement.

What can we say about the US trampling on the sovereign rights of other states?^a

The most rabid political figures in the United States - and in some cases they occupy quite high positions - they directly call for open and even armed

interference in the internal affairs of Cuba[®], seeking to impose order on the Cuban people pleasing to the imperialist monopolies of the USA.

If we bring President Kennedy's announcement of termination to its logical conclusion

«cold War» and strengthening peace, then it is necessary to abandon interference in

internal affairs of other states, respect their sovereignty, comply with norms

international law and not only in words, but also in deeds, respect the UN Charter and eliminate its military bases that are a springboard for aggression against other states

Or take such a fairly clear question as the conclusion of a non-aggression pact

between NATO countries and countries participating in the Warsaw Pact. Agreement on

only a warming of the political atmosphere would bring this issue. After all, it's speech

there are no territorial or other concessions, because the conclusion of such an agreement will bring equal benefits to all countries that sign it. And despite this, in Western ones

countries are told that such an agreement should not be signed. They explain it by saying that everyone we are members of the UN, whose Charter provides for non-aggression by some countries

others. But if it is invoked that the UN Charter provides for non-aggression[®], then

why did the Western powers create aggressive blocs? Talk about being a NATO bloc

designed for defensive purposes - this is talk for naive people. After all, many

the responsible figures of this military alliance do not hide its aggressive nature, its orientations against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

It turns out like this: to create tension in the world, even conclusions will be justified

military blocs, and when it is proposed to conclude a non-aggression pact, they say that such a pact not needed. But it is clear to every person that a non-aggression pact would be a positive thing

in improving relations between countries.

Some figures in the West blatantly claim that the non-aggression pact

one should not conclude, because it will lead to a reduction in tension, but an improvement

relations between states are not beneficial for them. The purpose of such figures is to support revanchists, constantly threaten the German Democratic Republic and others

• Original text «How Americans would look if the United States turned out to be

surrounded by a ring of Soviet Union troops targeting the United States? What can we say about the trampling of the United States

sovereign rights of other states?».

b The original text «... directly calls for interference in the internal affairs of Cuba,...». Edit

B.N. Ponomarev.

* Original text «Requested if the UN Charter provides for non-aggression, ...».

26

Signal instance

socialist countries and thereby inflate the Cold War and escalate it international tension.

Where is the logic in the argument that a non-aggression pact is not needed?

US President' speaks of ending the Cold War. We welcome these

statements. However, as they say[®], if you said A, then you must also say B, you must back up good statements and calls with practical actions.

Question. President Kennedy highlighted the issue of banning nuclear tests and disarmament.

How do you assess the prospects for concluding an agreement on the issue of prohibition

nuclear tests and, in particular, the upcoming negotiations in Moscow on this issue?
The answer. Negotiations to end nuclear testing are known to be ongoing several years. And now many speeches are being made in Geneva on this topic. What does the matter come down to? Western countries have put forward their own condition about a certain thing
number of inspections to conclude an agreement to stop nuclear testing. What? they want? They essentially want Soviet territory to be open to spies from NATO military headquarters.
Putting forward this demand suggests that the governments of Western states mistrust forms the basis of relations between nuclear powers. But if you stand on one point of view, it turns out that it will be impossible to resolve a single controversial international one question. It turns out that it's something like a fairy tale about a white bull: either we don't believe you, or you don't believe us.
The Soviet government has stated and continues to say that it will not provide territories of our country for inspection for espionage purposes. Science has proven the possibility detection of nuclear explosions through national controls. This, we think, is the President himself knows well, and, presumably, so does the audience to whom he delivered his speech I contacted you. In addition, we agreed to accept the proposal of English scientists - and we repeat now this consent of ours - to place a limited number of automatic ones seismic stations for observation purposes.
National means of detection in combination with automatic seismic stations are a reliable guarantee in order to identify any possible attempts violate the nuclear test ban agreement. As you know, we agreed to carry out two or three inspections to monitor the cessation of underground testing and we did this for political reasons. It was a step, so to speak towards the wishes of the other side. We have to regret that this is our proposal has not been properly evaluated by the negotiating partners.
"After the word «USA» the word «many» is crossed out.
in the Original text «However, they say,...

27

Signal signal

What is missing today? The desire of the Western powers to go for it is not enough agreement and to give up the game of negotiation'.
As for the Soviet Union, we are ready to sign a cessation agreement all nuclear tests today. It's up to the West. We agreed to a meeting representatives of the three powers in Moscow to once again try to agree on this question. But the success of this meeting will depend on what baggage they arrive with representatives of the USA and England to our country.
The President of the United States touches on such an important problem of our time like general and complete disarmament. He's right when he says it's neither simple nor easy the problem will take a lot of effort and some time to solve.
The Soviet government still spares no effort in considering issues disarmament. Statesmen must finally realize their great responsibility to humanity for solving such an urgent task as ending the arms race.
President Kennedy speaks in the sense that it would be good to direct the funds that were freed up from the arms race are for more noble purposes.
There really is still a lot of poverty, hunger and unemployment in the world. It would be good if for specific government actions followed with good wishes for disarmament United States.
The Soviet government's proposals in this regard are widely known.
To improve the international situation and relations between states along with these issues, expanding economic ties and development are important trade.
The President of the United States of America, unfortunately, did nothing in his speech

doesn't talk about it.

The government of the United States of America virtually prohibits trade with the Soviet Union?. True, the ban on the import of crabs from the Soviet Union into the United States was lifted

Union. Crabs are a really delicious thing. However, you can't go far on crabs.

The Soviet Union is a big country. We have all the necessary resources for development of industry, agriculture. We do without trade with the United

States of America and, apparently, in the future we will also be able to successfully develop our own farming without trading with them. I am talking about the development of trade between the Soviet Union and the United States because trade is an indicator of good relations between countries.

The United States of America not only does not trade with us itself, but also provides putting pressure on their allies, they are often prohibited from trading with the Soviet Union.

The most striking example of such pressure is that the United States forced the West German firms violate contractual obligations and not supply steel pipes to the Soviet Union.

and the Word «agreement» is replaced by «negotiations».

28

Signal ezemilar

This did not cause any damage to us, and those who succumbed to the pressure played. As they say, another cold impulse was added to the foundations of the Cold War.

See how the American press reacts to the presence of a delegation of workers soviet foreign trade located in the USA®. She almost blames this delegation not in anti-American activities' because the Soviet delegation seeks to establish contacts with business people to establish normal Soviet-American ones trade relations. If such activities are condemned in the United States as unacceptable' what remains of the words in favor of improving Soviet-American relations and the elimination of the Cold War?

Question. It is clear from the President's speech that he recognizes the inevitability and the need for states to coexist with different social systems.

At the same time, his speech repeats the usual statements of Western propaganda it's as if the communists are trying to impose their system on other countries and what, they say, this is the main cause of international tension.

What can be said about such statements by the US President?

The answer. In this case, the President of the United States, unfortunately, uses Dulles' dictionary who said a lot of swear words about communism. Capitalist orders they collapse and crack due to the objective laws of historical development. And the President tries to explain this «by the attempts of the communists to impose their political on others and the economic system». It is not because of swear words that the foundations of capitalism collapse, but because of irreconcilable ones

contradictions between labor and capital, as a result of the struggle of peoples for their freedom.

As you know, advocating the peaceful coexistence of states with different in social order, we do not propose coexistence in the field of ideologies, but we and they are not supporters of resolving ideological disputes through war between states. Such is our point of view, this is our policy.

In conclusion, I would like to say that in general the speech of US President Kennedy makes a positive impression. We welcome the call

to improving relations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, its statement «let's reconsider our attitude towards the Soviet Union». We agree

with the statement of the President that the peoples of our countries are mutually interested in preservation peace. The peoples of the Soviet Union respect the talented and hardworking

the people of the United States of America and want to have friendlier relations with them.

We are deeply convinced that the call of the President of the United States of America about improving relations between countries and eliminating «the Cold War», about improving relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States will be supported absolutely

* The words «un-American activities» in the original text were marked with quotation marks.

• Original text «If such activities are regarded in the United States as anti-American,». Edit
L.F. Ilyicheva.

29

Signal zhvemilar

by the majority of the American people; and the peoples of the Soviet Union have always stood and stand on these positions. We strive to ensure good relations between countries they were carried out in practice, but to achieve this one must spare no effort to fight with those forces* that take positions in waging «the Cold War» and resolving controversial issues questions by starting a war.

Time will tell whether these statements will be followed by concrete action american government, its political practice. Words about peace are necessary support with practical actions*. In these particular cases, the American government will find understanding and support from the Soviet government.

For our part, we will spare no effort to find a solution unresolved problems, establish good relations between our great powers.

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 294. L. 207. Original. Typewritten text. L. 208 - 217.

Cat electrographic. Typewritten
text with blue ballpoint pen editing
and with a simple pencil.

NO. 3

Recording of the conversation by N.S. Khrushchev with US Secretary of State D. Rusk
August 5, 1963 d 9

Reception

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N.S. KHRUSHCHEV

US Secretary of State D. RASKA10

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N.S. Khrushchev received him in the Kremlin on August 5
US Secretary of State D. Rusk, who was accompanied by the Chairman of the Senate
US Congress Foreign Affairs Commission D.W. Fulbright, United States Representative to the United Nations
E. Stevenson, Senators J.D. Aiken, L. Saltonstall, J.D. Sparkman, G.G. Humphrey
and J.O. Pastore, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
U.CH. Foster, Chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission G.T. Seaborg, special
US Assistant Secretary of State L. Thompson, US Representative to the Committee

* The words «and stand» are written in a simple pencil.

• The original text «... to fight within each state against those forces, ...». Editing by L.F. Ilyichev.

* Original text «Words about peace must be supported by practical deeds.».

đOn the first page, a blue ink litter supposedly made by G.T. Shuisky is on top

«Sent out», below - «The recording of the conversation by Comrade N.S. Khrushchev was not visible».

30

18 countries for disarmament!! H. Stell, Arms Control Agency consultant
and disarmament A. Dean, Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State of the United States R. Davis
and J. Greenfield, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense W. Bundy, and Ambassador
USA in the USSR F.D. Kohler.

N.S. Khrushchev says that he is glad to welcome D. Rask and those accompanying him
arrived for a noble cause of interest to all humanity - the signing of the Treaty
on the prohibition of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

A test ban is, figuratively speaking, a medical order. If anyone
against this, then such a person should be subjected to psychoanalysis, since he does not understand that
harmful to his health.

D. Rask thanks him for the warm welcome he received, and also for the fact that N.S. Khrushchev
postponed his leave in order to be present at the signing of the Treaty.

He reports to N.S. Warm greetings from Kennedy to Khrushchev and says he is looking forward
awaits conversations with N.S. Khrushchev and members of the Soviet government.

He notes that if everyone who aspired came to the Soviet Union from the United States

to be present at the signing would be perceived as an invasion.

N.S. Khrushchev says that we welcome such «invasions». He thanks

D. Rusk for his kind words and expresses his gratitude to Kennedy for his good wishes and for correct assessment of this historical act.

This should be considered an undertaking taken in the right direction creating a good environment for solving major problems.

You and we represent antagonistic systems of states, we have often used

and we use expressions of hostility towards each other and we should resolve issues

step by step. After all, even in order to knock down an oak tree, you must first chop it down

and file it. A mother, teaching her child to walk, does not push him in the back, but teaches him how to do it small steps, either he will hurt his nose or even his head.

Each such act of international importance gradually builds trust between

us, leads to the creation of a favorable atmosphere. We commend the actions

The President and Government of the United States, the Senate and all American citizens who they support the Agreement.

Nowadays, war can no longer be a tool for resolving controversial issues between

states. Therefore, we must pay attention to the development of the economy, culture, everything

meets a person's needs and brings him joy. We must end the arms race, which

leads to disaster.

Of course, our social systems are different and we cannot be convinced on this issue each other.

31

Signal exemplar

D. Rusk expresses his agreement that the systems are indeed different, however

there are also common interests, for example, the desire for peace. Maybe the Agreement will serve

the starting point for solving other problems. Both the US and the Soviet Union have a lot

internal tasks. So, the United States needs to build schools for

500 thousand students, reconstruct a number of large cities. To the Soviet government

there is also a lot more that needs to be done and we know, says D. Rusk, what kind of care he pays

N.S. Khrushchev improving the well-being of the Soviet people.

N.S. Khrushchev says that indeed our systems are incompatible even if

we lay side by side in coffins and would have taken different positions. But we need to build the best

life is for the living, not coffins. We must do everything to stop the arms race

don't stop there, go forward and forward. There are a number of questions that

I told Harriman 2, says N.S. Khrushchev, as well as in public speeches. Their

should be discussed.

For us, the root question is the German question. Until we solve it, we

all the time, like hedgehogs, we will collide with needles. It is clear what each side wants to decide

it's his own way. It is clear to us what a victory this would be for the President of the United States and Congress

and supporters of capitalism, if it were possible to liquidate the GDR. Well, what if it's the other way around? If

would Germany become a socialist country and join the socialist camp? However, however, however, however,

however, however,

in modern conditions, both are unrealistic, and this issue cannot be resolved without war.

We are experienced people and fought ourselves. Is it not time that we looked for acceptable solutions? To us

it is necessary to move the chariot of events from the military to the rails of peace, i.e. decide

questions in such a way as to record the actual situation.

Don't listen too much to Adenauer and your other allies

striving for one specific goal. We also have allies," continues

N.S. Khrushchev. Unfortunately, some of them do not understand the real situation

in the modern world. Time will pass and they, of course, will understand that they were wrong.

D. Rusk admits that the German question is of fundamental importance to relations

between our countries, and he, Rusk, would not like to exclude what could be done about it

come to some kind of mutual understanding. The German question is important for the Soviet Union

and the USA for historical reasons. The United States took part in wars in Europe twice

and they are interested in the stability of the situation in this area.

D. Rusk further says that he is ready to discuss the issue with Soviet representatives on the possibilities of finding a mutually acceptable solution during his stay in Moscow.

According to D. Rusk, recently there has been some easing of the situation

in the center of Europe. Relations, in particular trade, between Germany and the countries have improved lying to the east of it.

32

Signal zemilar

N.S. Khrushchev notes that D. Rusk does not want to pronounce the word «socialist»

and he calls these countries «lying to the east». We will teach you how to pronounce this word says N.S. Khrushchev.

D. Rusk notes that this is not difficult, as some people call the United States a socialist country.

N.S. Khrushchev says it would be interesting to look at such a person.

D. Rusk says that he recently visited Yugoslavia and it worked out for him

the impression is that in the United States the state is more involved in economic life than in this country. Rusk notes that the term «encouragement» has been in use lately in socialist countries.

N.S. Khrushchev says that there were indeed disputes with some communists

about moral and material factors. We believe that during the transition period the impact of these factors must be intertwined.

As for capitalism, at one time it was a progressive phenomenon

compared to feudalism. But capitalism is inevitably being replaced by socialism

communism, which is the highest social formation compared to everyone else

previous formations. There would be no capitalism, there would be no Marx, and in this case humanity might not have gone beyond the legends of Christ and the dreams of Campanella.

D. Rusk says he heard about the content of the commission chairman's conversations atomic Energy Seaborg, Ministers Eudoll and Freeman with N.S. Khrushchev and others

soviet leaders!3. They believe that there is a wide range of issues on which it is possible it would be an agreement. In the infantry, when there is an offensive on a broad front, sometimes an obstacle arises in some place, but the offensive as a whole is because of this

doesn't stop. Likewise, both the United States and the Soviet Union could cooperate in the field of development space, nuclear energy, medicine, not forgetting about fundamental issues. Rusk expresses desire to discuss such issues during his stay in Moscow

N.S. Khrushchev says that we are ready to discuss larger issues.

D. Rusk notes that, without being authorized to speak on behalf of the Senate, he I would like to ask Senator Fulbright to say a few words.

D. Fulbright says he already had the opportunity to date NS. Khrushchev

four years ago in the Senate Foreign Relations Commission'4. Fulbright says,

that he is not a diplomat, but a politician and believes that all differences can be overcome like this

this was the case with the differences between the North and South of the USA. The Soviet has goals

and the American governments are the same, only the ways to achieve them are different. Both

governments strive to improve the lives of the people. It seems that there are differences between both

the countries are not as large as they seem. After all, some blame the Soviet Union

the fact is that capitalism is developing there.

33

Signal instance

N.S. Khrushchev says that the philosophy of the United States and the Soviet Union is different.

The US government says its ultimate goal is to ensure the well-being of the people.

But in the USA, capitalist property and such social conditions prevail

when everyone is for himself and everyone is against one. And we are achieving rapid development of our own

economies based on socialist property under such social conditions

when one for all and all for one.

However, we are ready to take what is good in the USA. Lenin highly valued American enterprise and efficiency, Stalin also spoke positively about it. When US Secretary Yudin came here, he noted that the Americans had something to do learn from Soviet hydroelectric power station builders. But at one time we learned this from American specialists. So both teachers and students turned out to be worthy of each other. Now one of the main tasks is to improve agriculture in the Soviet Union. We intend to do a lot in the next 7 years, and a final solution will be reached by 1980!6, N.S. Khrushchev says his friend is the capitalist Gars!7 says that for the main thing for boosting agriculture is artificial fertilizers, and this requires money. Now we have this money. We invest billions of rubles in chemicals industry, into the construction of a number of artificial fertilizer plants, the polyethylene, terylene, etc. Some believed that if the Soviet Union was forced to race weapons, then it will not catch up with the United States economically. Thinking like that is stupid, this one the race did not stop the development of the national economy of the USSR. At the end of the conversation N.S. Khrushchev invites Rask to come to him in the Caucasus. D. Rusk thanks for the invitation. From the Soviet side, vols. were present at the conversation. A.A. Gromyko, V.V. Kuznetsov, M.N. Smirnovsky, A.F. Dobrynin and L.M. Zamyatin. Recorded by O. Alennikov. RGANI. F. 52. Op. 1. D. 583. L. 151 - 157. Copy (3 copies). Typewritten text. Ne 4

Recording of the conversation by N.S. Khrushchev with US Secretary of State D. Rusk
g. Gagra
9 August 1963 a18

RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION

comrade. N.S. KHRUSHCHEV with US Secretary of State D. RASKOMA»
a On the first sheet on top of the litter with a simple pencil «t. Shuisky».
in Document Footnote: «The recording of the conversation by Comrade N.S. Khrushchev was not visible.».
34

Signal instance

After exchanging greetings, Rask says N.S. Khrushchev, that he and those accompanying him his faces just returned from Leningrad yesterday. He really liked this historical one a city of great traditions. N.S. Khrushchev notes that Leningrad is the city of our revolutionary glory a symbol of the resilience of the Soviet people. Leningrad — is a city of wonderful cultural ones values. After the war, continues N.S. Khrushchev, we managed to rebuild Leningrad and make it even more beautiful than it was before the war. We've achieved big ones lately success in urban regeneration and expansion. For example, now every year so many houses are being built in Moscow that it is estimated that this amounts to 1/3 of the pre-revolutionary one housing stock of Moscow. In other words, every three years we build a new Moscow. Rusk says that at the beginning of the conversation, he would first like to express his feelings deep satisfaction in connection with his visit to the USSR. This was his first trip to the Soviet Union, and he is happy that it coincided with such an event as the signing Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. We, Rusk continues, are exceptionally high we appreciate the friendliness and hospitality shown to us. We thank you, Mr. Chairman To your colleagues and the entire Soviet people for a wonderful reception. President Kennedy co he expressed his hope in all sincerity that the signing of this Treaty would be the first step towards easing tensions and a solid basis for improving relations between USA and USSR. It is known that Soviet-American relations are of primary importance significance not only for the Soviet and American peoples, but for the whole world. Rusk notes that he is ready to discuss with N.S. Khrushchev is interested in everything on both sides questions. N.S. Khrushchev says there is satisfaction in the Soviet Union too

in connection with the signing of the Treaty and expresses the hope that the American guests we felt that the people and government of the USSR approved of this agreement. We are high we appreciate the efforts made by the US President and Secretary of State to reaching an agreement on this issue. This Treaty is a matter from which neither side loses anything; on the contrary, our countries benefit from this, just as and other countries of the East and West, and the whole world. We would consider it very useful, continues N.S. Khrushchev, for our peoples and for the whole world not to stop there, but to strive to develop agreements for other questions. This could be a precedent for the US President came to Moscow to sign a new agreement. That would be a good combination - the signing of the agreement and his return visit, which he must pay us, moreover signing the agreement would create a favorable background for the manifestation of the traditional one the cordiality of our people. In principle, it is possible to agree on such issues, from the solutions of which no one loses and everyone just wins.

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Signal instance

Rusk says he believes President Kennedy would like to visit to the Soviet Union, and he talked about the possibility of this when the appropriate one develops the situation. When the right moment comes, such a trip can be made and this will demonstrate genuine feelings of friendship between our peoples and there will be promote the development of Soviet-American relations. It's important to look for one a favorable moment to make efforts to make it appear. N.S. Khrushchev says that he agrees with this and speaks out in favor of the conclusion non-aggression Pact. Treaty or non-aggression pact between the Warsaw countries the Treaty and NATO countries are like Seltzer water, it doesn't change anything, no one changes anything it does not gain or lose, but has a refreshing effect on the public body. Rusk further notes that, as Harriman reported to N.S. Khrushchev on instructions President Kennedy, the United States is carefully studying this issue with your advisors. He, Rask, spoke to A.A. Gromyko that they have a number of questions regarding this pact, but in the broad sense of the word, the ideas included in the project presented in Geneva, acceptable. The United States stands for the provisions of the UN Charter, for resolve controversial issues peacefully, through negotiations, do not use force or threaten use force. The questions from the American side regarding the pact mainly concern the aims of this pact and how it can actually help to improve the environment. Rask assures N.S. Khrushchev that the United States will consider this proposal notes in the most serious manner and without delay that he takes note statement by the Soviet side that, in its opinion, issues of form will not cause difficulties. By in his view, the non-aggression pact does nothing more than the Kellogg-Briand pact.²⁰ If such a pact will be concluded if there are a number of unresolved problems the public will ask questions regarding the value of such a pact. Frankly speaking, Rusk notes, since there are now a number of unresolved issues, we believe that the pact it would be better to conclude on non-aggression after they have been reached agreement, not at the beginning. There are serious problems such as Berlin and Germany, in addition, we can say that it will be difficult to conclude such a pact if the Laotian issue will not be finally resolved. In particular, we wanted the same touch on the Laotian issue. We believe that it is possible to eliminate this outbreak dangers provided the parties act in the spirit of the Geneva Agreements?¹ and, if the USA and the USSR work together. Rusk further notes that his statements regarding the non-aggression pact are preliminary remarks and they are now in thorough consultation with the by their allies, to clearly understand their opinion on this issue, because hardly it would be helpful if the US and England expressed views that do not reflect the point of view of all their allies.

36

Signal instance

Rusk adds that there are currently discussions in America regarding the treaty on a nuclear test ban and it will take two to three weeks to ratify the Treaty the Senate?². Therefore, he asks to understand that if the United States remains silent for some time the question of a non-aggression pact is only because they want to apply the maximum efforts to achieve the largest number of positive votes now

Test Ban Treaty.

N.S. Khrushchev says that we understand this and in this case we have nowhere to rush.

N.S. Khrushchev continues: You raised the question of the order of events. Us too

I like this point of view - first a series of events, and then the signing of a pact

about non-aggression. We would also prefer to address the major issues affecting our relationship, take on difficult, and in fact simple issues - signing

the German Peace Treaty and the resolution on this basis of the issue of West Berlin. This is the main problems that need to be solved and, so to speak, «pugnacious» problems.

At one time we had a questionnaire survey of employees of institutions and they say this

the case is that to the question: «do you believe in God?» one employee replied: «not at work,

and at home I believe». It's the same with a peace treaty - if you ask one on one: you -

for a peace treaty? They answer confidentially - yes, but they don't want to talk about it publicly

talk. When, in a conversation with Eisenhower, I raised the issue of the German peace

agreement?³, I did not meet any opposition from him. In this case, he thought the same way

and de Gaulle, who proved to me that he was not against a peace treaty.²⁴

, but only in order to

West Germany remained in the union of Western countries.

I told him that this was an issue that the West Germans themselves should decide.

De Gaulle even said that it was good that there were two Germanys, and it would be even better to have one

three Germanys, and there is no need to rush to resolve this issue at all, let it remain as it is

he is. This is, of course, the wrong position. Peoples need to decide their own destiny.

N.S. Khrushchev further notes that he asked Eisenhower why the United States was arming

West Germany, because it's dangerous. Eisenhower replied that Germany was competing

it competes quite successfully with America economically. If Western

Germany will be free from arms costs and will be an even more dangerous rival

USA, so it is beneficial for them to arm Germany.

As for de Gaulle's position, it must be said, oddly enough, that he is the farthest

western countries went over the issue of borders and publicly stated what he recognizes

german borders?, others do it only in a whisper.

If analyzed, continues N.S. Khrushchev, who speaks in NATO countries

against a peace treaty, it will become clear that only Adenauer. De Gaulle is against it

this is only in form, but in essence he is for an agreement. He does this because he thinks that

this will help in his fight against America; therefore he is looking for a strong state

37

Signal instance

in Europe, which he could rely on, and at the same time relies on Adenauer, i.e.

engaged in political speculation. This is one of the consequences of rebirth

imperialism, its insoluble contradictions, but I would not like to go deeper into this.

Regarding the position of the English government, we can say that the Conservatives are also in favor

a peace treaty, but they don't want to say so, so as not to upset the Western orchestra.

Labor has long said that they consider our position on this issue reasonable.

Did Spaak tell me?⁶, and he knows well the opinion of those NATO countries where they are in power like this

called workers' parties, that they are also in favour of a peace treaty. Denmark, Norway, Holland,

Luxembourg and others are not against the treaty. So that leaves West Germany, yes

and France, which is doing this in the interests of its struggle for leadership in Europe, to

knock the US political influence out of Europe and take this place, but it is weak and wants to

achieve this by relying on West Germany. I believe that the government's position

The US is similar to England's position, and if there were no such political speculation France, the United States could agree to sign a peace treaty. Clearly also that there is a certain Adenauer impact here. Oddly enough, it turns out like this that Adenauer became an international policy-making figure. He imposes his own views, their own aggressive course directed against socialist countries. It turns out so that the vanquished lead by the vanquished.

If you look at our and your position, the position of NATO, then essentially you the conclusion is recognized that existing borders cannot be changed through war developed after the Second World War. But this needs to be formalized publicly and the peace treaty precisely pursues this goal. In the West, some people want to save it cold War, but it's dangerous. Now, 10 years after Dulles performed with calls to discard socialism in Europe?, you began to realize that you were wrong. So we must recognize the boundaries legally. They tell us - we have to wait. But it's hard to say what will happen in five to ten years. The world is changing quickly. They could happen unwanted political events, people may lose patience and hope and Eastern European countries may agree to unilaterally sign the agreement. We are we have said and continue to say that we would welcome the opportunity to sign the agreement together but we may be forced to sign the agreement unilaterally. You declare, that this will lead to war, but we think that the Americans will have more common sense than nonsense. What, indeed, is the point for Americans to wage war in defense of their interests Adenauer, who, by the way, may soon die, because we are all mortals.

Rusk says he would like to make a few general comments. He has it I was deeply impressed by the trip to the Soviet Union and what he saw the Soviet people are working. He drove America from San Francisco to New York and knows how the American people are working. There is no doubt that as an American people, so

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and the Soviet people want to work most fruitfully and want peace. US government and the USSR must give its peoples this opportunity.

Rusk further notes that, in his opinion, only Chairman Khrushchev and the President The Kennedys truly understand what war is. There are, of course, other people who they know the technical details well, but responsibility for the fate of the world lies with these two to the leaders. Therefore, it is necessary to strive to look for and find solutions to the possible more questions. War in our time is a terrible phenomenon. President Kennedy recently, in one of his speeches, he quoted statements to the American people N.S. Khrushchev about the true nature of modern war.

Rusk goes on to say that history has connected both the USSR and the USA with Germany. More this, of course, applies to the Soviet Union, which suffered much more from hitler's troops. Since the Soviet Union and the United States fought Hitler together, they the German question should not allow them to be separated. As for the peaceful one treaty, then the United States is concerned not with the very idea of a peace treaty, but with the fact that it may lead to ossification of the current situation.

In 1954, the Western powers solemnly declared that they would not try change existing boundaries through force?8

- . True, it was done differently

chance, but this solemn commitment remains valid. The US deeply regrets that

The USSR does not agree with their point of view. They ask you to believe what they say. They are they hope that the USSR will agree that to resolve the German issue on a permanent basis the basis needs to link it to the wishes of the peoples concerned. True, Rask

I can't imagine how the East Germans will be able to express their will. According to Rusk, if the USA and the USSR divide the people of West and East Germany without their consent and leave this will simply sow the seeds of discord and will not eliminate the danger of war in the future. The People Germany itself must organize its own destiny.

We agree, Rusk continues, that Germany should not have a national

nuclear power. In this we have the same position. We believe that there are already enough nuclear ones powers. As you know, this is exactly the policy we are pursuing, and this has led to the fact that our relations with France have become very strained. We don't want the Germans to have nuclear weapons, both of their own production and those transferred to them by others. Let's say that our relations will continue to calm down and improve. For the we need to make some efforts to do this, to allow more contacts and communication not only between West and East Germany, but also between the West and the socialist countries. As you can see, Rusk notes jokingly, I have already learned to use this word. Already now we can say that there are signs of improvement in the situation. A position that two - three years ago it seemed difficult, but now it is improving. I also believe that we can make progress in addressing the issue of disarmament. There are activities that you can do

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Signal zemilar

it is possible to reach an agreement in the near future, some agreements can be concluded, and this will have an impact significant assistance in solving disarmament problems and will change the situation for the better side and with regard to relations between NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact. It is difficult to count on comprehensive, decisive disarmament measures, but in a number of ways an agreement can be reached on the issues. This will allow us to pick up speed in the direction solutions to the problem of disarmament. Whatever can be decided regarding the agreement in Europe, the main thing still depends on solving the problem of disarmament, and, if this is done, this will be a fundamental improvement for the capitalist West and the socialist East. It seems to me that the governments that exist today inherited the severity of the problems of the post-war period. Each side brings the past in its approach to German and Berlin issues. We are right after graduation the wars withdrew their troops from East German territory and introduced some units to West Berlin. Did we do this in the interests of reaching an agreement?, although at that for a while, some thought that such a solution to the issue could lead to complications here too voices were heard to demand a corridor to West Berlin. We didn't insist this before the Soviet government, since it could be interpreted as lack of trust in the Soviet Union, our wartime ally. Then we got experience of the blockade,^{3°}, there was later an agreement on access routes, and we proceeded from the fact that we must maintain trust in the Soviet government. We still believe that we need to look ways to strengthen such trust. It is necessary to carry out various activities in the humanitarian field, in the field of trade, etc. This will increase confidence and raise hopes for the future. It seems to me that we and you have now taken on significant things responsibility in resolving the German issue, and our presence in West Berlin led to stability of the situation, and not vice versa. We don't know who can do what there and what could have happened if we and you had not taken responsibility for maintaining peace in this part of the globe.

N.S. Khrushchev emphasizes the need to sign a peace treaty. This is an inevitable act, natural after the end of the war.

I agree, continues N.S. Khrushchev, with your many reasonable arguments. But however, we do not agree that the signing of the agreement should be postponed. If there will be no agreement, tensions will remain in our relations. The GDR cannot agree with the fact that communications used by Americans pass through its territory and they don't pay for it. Let's say the GDR cuts your telegraph cables. After all, you don't pay for it. Moreover, the GDR has all the rights to do this.

You encouraged West Germany not to pay us reparations, even those which were agreed upon in Potsdam. This applies in particular to the dismantling of some enterprises. West Germany has stopped paying us reparations, and that, of course

Signal exemilar

became one of the causes of friction. And the GDR and countries such as Hungary and Finland paid all reparations to us, while, I repeat, West Germany is the richest country in Europe and directly responsible for the war, did not pay reparations based on you³. We agree with your point of view and negotiate accordingly in peace agreement that the path for the reunification of the two German states will remain open and that the signatories of the peace treaty will help resolve the issue on the reunification of Germany, and this should be the subject of an agreement german states. We, of course, have different positions. We sympathize with the political the system in the GDR, and you - the system in the Federal Republic of Germany. It's natural. But you can't change the system in the GDR, just like us, we will not be able to change the system in West Germany. Such questions they are decided by the people of these two states themselves. N.S. Khrushchev jokingly notes that American «calluses» are on the territories of the GDR and they should be removed from there, and we will help with this. We need to do this now without waiting for them to start stepping on. By the way, says N.S. Khrushchev, expression about calluses belongs to Lippmann, this smart person you have. Rusk says that Western countries left Saxony and Thuringia at one time from territories of several hundred square kilometers. N.S. Khrushchev says we are not going to take over West Berlin. This is for us just don't. Let it be the third German state with a special status whose sovereignty must be respected by all countries. Rusk notes that American «calluses» are tempting due to their special nature geographical conditions, but this temptation should be restrained, since the United It will only be quite difficult for the states to apologize if someone steps on these calluses. He further says that he attaches some importance to N.S.'s remark. Khrushchev that the people should be questioned on the issue of German reunification. In his opinion, we need to interview the people of East and West Germany separately. Rusk emphasizes that he is not raising this issue now; he is asking at all whether it will be possible to find out an opinion people of different parts of Germany separately. It is important for him to find out his point of view Soviet Union on how it will be possible to find out the opinion of the population of East Germany moreover, he asks this not for short-term tactical reasons, but from the point vision of long-term stability on the continent. Tom is on the continent itself, jokingly remarks Rask, which, according to de Gaulle's definition, extends from the Atlantic to the Urals. N.S. Khrushchev says that, in his opinion, this issue cannot exist now subject of discussion. Both parts of Germany have governments and parliaments elections have been held several times and, in particular, people's elections will soon take place chamber of the GDR on the most democratic foundations. Is there any need for this somehow still interviewing people?

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Signal instance

I would like to ask further, continues N.S. Khrushchev, when you and we admitted ayyub Khan Government, has the opinion of the people of Pakistan been asked:²? But Ayub Khan removed a government elected on a democratic basis. Have you asked the people Guatemala after the president was expelled and the legitimate government was overthrown with the help of American intelligence³³? Have you asked the people of South Vietnam where Diem is carries out brutal repression against the population³⁴? If you ask the people, make sure that the people do not want the Diem regime and they would have to leave immediately without you. So let's do it do not raise such questions. You can also remember that the United States is more than a hundred fifty years ago «they voted» war against England³⁵, and we did the same when the White Guards and their American, English, French, and Polish were expelled and other allies. The people fight according to their own laws and their own methods. It can also be done recall that you recognized the Franco regime, which overthrew the legitimate government

Spain36. Who chose this bandit government, which was imposed on the people Spain? And you can find many such governments.

Rusk notes that there is a significant difference in cases where governments fall it was an internal matter. A very lively debate on this could be launched question, since the American side also has its own idea of some governments in different countries. But he, Rusk, does not intend to delve into this issue. He he understands that N.S. Khrushchev has his own position on this matter, and can only regret it that it is impossible to find a common language.

Rusk jokingly notes that in this case he is not an optimist and does not hope that this one the problem can be solved now, at this table, although that would be a good thing.

N.S. Khrushchev says he has an unpleasant question: about the Geneva agreements elections were supposed to be held in South Vietnam, but the elections were long overdue the agreements are two years old, but there are no elections; they were disrupted by the United States. In this case

the American side is clearly showing a mercantile approach - which is beneficial to it a democratic and correct process.

N.S. Khrushchev further notes that, apparently, this issue should be put aside and talk about a more harmless matter - about trade. We would like to purchase from America large amount of chemical equipment. If only we were provided the opportunity to negotiate with American industrialists, we would be with them we agreed.

Rusk says Minister Freeman told him about his conversation with NS. Khrushchev by these questions. In addition, he, Rusk, spoke with President Kennedy on this topic.

As he already told A.A. Gromyko, the American side will consider the issue of sale Soviet Union chemical plants. She's ready to discuss this. Speaking of trade, it is possible distinguish two groups of goods: those covered by acts of Congress, and those that

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Signal ezemilar

which such acts do not apply. According to Rusk, chemical plants do not require any legislative acts of Congress. If the executive authorities can decide he will definitely take up this issue upon his return to Washington.

Rusk further notes that N.S. Khrushchev said that trade leads to peace. He, Rusk also believes that those who trade want peace, not trade - they don't want peace. He I am convinced that as the situation improves, trade will develop. Socialist the countries trade quite successfully with Western Europe and Japan. Their turnover is 5.5 billion dollars. This is a huge number. The USA has little trade with socialist countries. The fact is that if the situation worsens in any way questions, for example, the question of Berlin, will be put under pressure by many people the question will arise whether trade really leads to peace. It is possible, therefore, apparently believe that trade in itself does not relieve tension, but leads to its easing.

He agrees that trade is one of the indicators of good relations and the United States is glad that between Western Europe and socialist Europe states are opening trade channels. He would be very pleased if such channels they will also open in trade with the United States.

N.S. Khrushchev says trade is not a favor. Nobody trades with another in order to do a favor, but he trades when it is profitable. Prohibition of trade it is determined, of course, by political considerations, and not by considerations of benefit. Countries that have trade-restricting laws are not good

interests. We stand for free trade between all countries. Would be good, continues N.S. Khrushchev, if only you could prove that you also strive for this and convince the ambassador Kohler, who takes a cold position in matters of Soviet-American trade war and opposes the development of our trade, act in a different direction. By the way, our trading organizations are not particularly keen to place orders for chemical equipment in the USA. They explain this by saying that American

the equipment is the most expensive in the world, and we will place orders in other Western countries if we will be able to agree on a suitable price. We are ready to place very large ones in the USA orders if American industrialists want it, but subject to a company loan and if prices correspond to world prices. We don't extend our hand we want to trade on equal terms.

Rusk notes that, as he heard from American industrialists, the Soviet the trading community enjoys a very good reputation.

He further says that he will definitely consider the issue of chemical plants return to Washington and, perhaps, the US legislature will return to those again measures that are inhibitory in relation to the provision of loans. Well as for Ambassador Kohler, he acts according to instructions. He, Rusk, knows that Kohler

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Signal instance

at one time he received «bruises» from Congress for his attempts to liberalize trade relations with socialist countries.

In conclusion, he would like to say that, as he already said, A.A. Gromyko, the American side would like to continue discussions with Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington on trade issues and try to come up with solutions favorable to development of trade between the USA and the USSR.

N.S. Khrushchev says he mentioned a company loan, not a government loan although we would also welcome state credit, this is already a matter of policy.

In any case, we want to trade on an equal basis. We want to buy that we it also suits you at fair prices that correspond to prices on the world market.

Rusk jokingly notes that they call it «Yankee-style trading»

when partners bargain furiously and still find a solution that satisfies both parties and beneficial to them all.

N.S. Khrushchev says that he remembers that, in particular, we had Dupont with the company good trading relationship⁷⁸. He is well aware that a number of American industrialists would be willing to trade with us if the US government did not interfere with them.

These industrialists appealed to the appropriate American authorities and were dissatisfied, having been refused their request for permission to trade with us, they are dissatisfied US government policy on trade issues. They believe, and correctly believe, that while we do not have trade with the USA, other countries such as Germany, France, Japan will find it the road to the vast market of the Soviet Union.

Rusk says he would like to say a few words about Laos.

The American side is concerned about the situation in Laos. America attaches great importance for the Soviet Union and the United States to work together in support of the Geneva Agreements which is based on the personal consent of N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy, achieved in Vienna³⁹.

It is known that the United States was reluctant to accept the terms of the Geneva agreements and the proposal

about the coalition government led by Suwanna Fuma. However, the US is loyal the coalition government and Prime Minister Suwanna Fuma supported the actions International Control Commission and the Geneva Agreements. United States quite concerned that Suwanna Fuma is having great difficulties with Pathet Lao ⁴⁰.

It is possible that this will lead to the collapse of the Geneva agreements. According to the US, this issue is important not only for the cause of preserving peace in Southeast Asia, but also for the cause maintaining trust between the USA and the USSR. The Soviet ambassador in Vientiane spoke to the American Ambassador that he has no contact with the Pathet Lao, and his influence on these forces it's falling. In this regard, we can recall that the American side also had difficulties regarding contacts with certain elements in Laos. He, Rusk, hopes that the American and Soviet ambassadors will work in close cooperation with the English

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Signal instance

ambassador, as co-chairs, and will promote compliance with the agreement, striving to resolve emerging disagreements. According to Rusk, it would be an encouraging factor for the cause of peace, if only the Soviet Union, England, the USA and other participants in Geneva the agreements would continue to provide public support for the Geneva Accords. He also hopes that the Soviet Union will be able to influence the Polish representative in the International Control Commission in the direction that it cooperate with the ICC and he showed a positive and constructive attitude towards emerging problems. We are we hope, Rusk continues, that the Soviet Union will clearly show that it supports independence and neutrality of Laos. I would like to add that, as indicated by the President Kennedy, we have no ambitious plans for Laos. The one who saw the Laotians in them the country would not want them to be their allies. I must say that these are strange people having their own special approach to all issues. We are in favour of the Laotians themselves we resolved our issues. I would like to remind you that President Kennedy, when he came to power, showed a certain courage and changed American policy towards Laos, which it wasn't always the same as it is now.

N.S. Khrushchev notes that we no longer want to deal with Laotian issues.

We believe that we have achieved the goals for which we were achieved in Vienna agreement with President Kennedy. A neutral government was established in Laos led by Suwanna Fuma, who pursued a policy of neutrality. Now they want it fight among yourself. What should we do? Send troops there? Good on this point americans have experience. They sent troops to South Vietnam to, so to speak keep your pants up at Diem's, and these American soldiers are slowly being killed. We are we adhere to a different policy, we do not want to interfere in the affairs of Laos and believe that the people I have to figure everything out myself. It has its own government, and we cannot impose your recommendations, especially since we are not asked to do so. They may simply ask us who you are such in general and why do you interfere in things that are not your own. We believe that we have fulfilled our goals

functions and we are not going to perform any new events. There are three there forces led by three princes, let them fight among themselves and gain intelligence. To me I don't want to get a headache because of Laos, I have my own responsibilities to mine by the people. We have no troops or observers in Laos, but only an ambassador who he listens to what the Lao government tells him and conveys it to us. We believe that we we fulfilled our obligations well, and now, apparently, the second stage has arrived, so let it be they fight among themselves, maybe they will become wiser.

N.S. Khrushchev jokingly notices that good housewives are a sweet dish

they save it for the end of lunch, and Rusk saved a bitter pill at the end of the conversation. N.S. Khrushchev offers to continue the conversation at the dinner table.

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Signal zemilar

Rusk asks permission to say a few words in order to end the discussion

this question is what he says, as he understood, N.S. Khrushchev believes that the Geneva agreements done. The US is concerned that if the great powers that signed Geneva agreements will remain silent, and it will seem that they are not interested in the situation in Laos and then the parties in Laos may think that they have support certain great powers. Of course, it is difficult to understand the Laotians who can today fight among themselves, and tomorrow take part in a common water festival. To him it seems that the Soviet Union, England, France, the USA and other countries are serious they want to achieve harmony and harmony in Laos. He would once again like to address the Soviet the government is called upon to publicly express its support for the Geneva agreements. It should also be taken into account that the agreement on Laos was one of the most productive agreements that have taken place between the USA and the USSR recently.

At the end of the conversation, when N.S. Khrushchev noted that he would apparently go to the fall

rask said the State Department gave the bear hunt to the American polar

there are firm instructions for hunters to stay away from «Soviet ones in the Arctic

polar bears», referring to the Soviet note of protest over the violation
«by American hunters» of the Soviet border in the Alaska region'!.
The conversation lasted 2:30.

Present: from the American side - Ambassador-at-Large L. Thompson,
U.S. Ambassador to the USSR F. Kohler, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State R. Davis,
US State Department employee A. Akalovsky; from the Soviet side - vol. A.A. Gromyko,
A.F. Dobrynin.

Recorded by: Yu. Vinogradov.

RGANI. F. 52. Op. 1. D. 583. L. 160 - 177. Copy. Typewritten text,
NO. 5

Note by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.A. Gromyko in the CPSU Central Committee
about the draft message of N.S. Khrushchev to US President J.F. Kennedy

No. 2442/GS

16 August 1963

Secretly. Ex. NO. 2

Central Committee of the CPSU

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents a draft letter from Comrade. N.S. Khrushchev to the US President
J. Kennedy, which would be advisable to convey through ours
ambassador

comrade. A.F. Dobrynin, returning to Washington the other day.

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Signal signal

Draft resolution attached 42.

Please consider.

A. Gromyko

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 322. L. 56. Copy (2 copies). Typewritten text.

NO. 6

Resolution of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee «On the letter from Comrade. Khrushcheva N.S.
US President J. Kennedy»

No. 17111/6

16 August 1963 43

Approve the draft letter from Comrade. Khrushchev N.S. US President J. Kennedy
(attached).

Kennedy.

Instruct the USSR Ambassador to the USA Comrade. Dobrynin A.F. transmit a letter to the President
(Appendix]

To paragraph 6 of prot (col] No. 111

Dear Mr. President,"

Taking advantage of the return of our Ambassador A. Dobrynin to Washington, I would like to
express some of your thoughts in connection with the state of affairs now emerging
the way the Nuclear Weapon Test Ban Treaty was signed in Moscow.

I think both our governments are pleased about this

signing of this Agreement. Yes, it is understandable - after all, the Treaty is such a matter, from
which neither side loses anything; on the contrary, from such an agreement equally
both our countries and other countries of the world, all of humanity, win degrees.

A clear indication of support for this good endeavor is

in particular, the fact that immediately after the signing of the Treaty by US representatives

The USSR and England, many other countries not only declared their readiness to join

to this Treaty, but have already put their signatures to it'. Literally from all over

the Soviet government is now receiving a stream of letters, messages, and congratulations.

Apparently, the White House mail is no less busy. This once again shows that

the public around the world has received considerable satisfaction and welcomes the agreement

a On the first sheet under the main text is printed: «To His Excellency

to Mr. John F. Kennedy,

To the President of the United States of America
g. Washington».

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Signal zempayar

three governments, which not only cleanses the world's atmosphere of harmful things precipitation, but in a certain sense it also makes the international political atmosphere cleaner. All this strengthens the hopes of peoples for further détente and creates the prospect of resolving other unresolved issues.

As far as I can tell from your statements, Mr. President, as well as from the remarks here by your Secretary of State, Mr Rask, you share ours the conviction that now it is important not to stop there, but to take action further steps from the good start we have made. Of course, the path ahead of us is not easy. However, we must follow it persistently and persistently, walk, albeit slowly, but and without slowing down, consistently achieving a solution to the overdue international ones problems, which again would meet the interests of not only our two countries, but the whole world. There is hardly any need to list all these problems here again. They are called us many times. I mentioned them in my last conversation with Mr. Rusk. I wanted to I would just like to emphasize that these problems are waiting to be solved. And it's better to solve them, without delaying, as they say, the matter, to decide exactly now, in the current calmer, and therefore more favorable, environment than at other circumstances that may always arise because they still remain serious unresolved problems.

Mr. Rask has already managed, of course, to inform you about his stay in the Soviet Union and about our conversations with him. We believe that the Secretary of State's visit to us was useful. In a short period, Mr. Rask managed, in addition to Moscow, to visit Leningrad, the city of the greats historical traditions, as well as on the Black Sea coast. As I understood him, he was pleased your trip. I was told that the senators present were also satisfied with the trip at the signing of the Agreement. I don't know to what extent this can facilitate passage ratification of the Treaty by the US Senate, but the fact that they visited us and met, in addition to among other things, with our deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, it is, in our opinion, a positive factor. We have always believed that such contacts contribute better mutual understanding.

During conversations with the Secretary of State, we had the opportunity to exchange with him opinions on a well-known range of issues, including direct issues soviet-american relations. Naturally, improving relations between ours countries would exert their beneficial influence and facilitate the search for a solution to indigenous people international problems that now divide us.

Mr Rask expressed the wish, following his report to you, Mr President, to continue exchange of views on all such issues. We agree with this, and moreover, we believe continued exchange of views is necessary.

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Signal exemilar

I, my wife Nina Petrovna and our entire family are sending a helmet to you, your wife and family greetings and best wishes.

Please accept, Mr. President, our sincere sympathy for what has befallen you loss - the death of a newborn son⁴⁵.

Best Regards

N. KHRUSHCHEV

August 17, 1963

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 322. L. 53 - 55. Copy (2 copies). Typewritten text.

NO. 7

Note by First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.V. Kuznetsova

to the CPSU Central Committee about the draft message of N.S. Khrushchev to US President J. F. Kennedy

and British Prime Minister G. Macmillan

No. 2873/GS

5 October 1963

Secretly. Ex. NO. 1

Central Committee of the CPSU

In accordance and with instructions, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents draft messages to Comrade. Khrushchev

N.S. US President J. Kennedy and British Prime Minister G. McMillan

on the occasion of the entry into force of the Treaty Banning Tests of Nuclear Weapons in the Atmosphere in outer space and under water.

The Treaty will enter into force after the exchange of instruments of ratification, which scheduled to be produced on October 10, 1963.

Draft resolution annexed*7.

Please consider.

IN. Kuznetsov

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 350. L. 22. Original. Typewritten text. Signature - autograph - blue ballpoint pen.

* Top of the note in the left corner of the litter with black ink «For. Khrushchev 7/X-1963».

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Signal instance

NO. 8

Resolution of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee «On the messages of the so-called. Khrushcheva N.S.

US President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Macmillan

on the occasion of the entry into force of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in three environments»

No. 17118/25

9 October 1963 48

1. Approve the text of messages vol. Khrushcheva N.S. US President J. Kennedy and to British Prime Minister G. Macmillan (attached).

2. Publish messages from vol. Khrushcheva N.S. in print*.

(Appendix)

To paragraph 25 of Prot [col] No. 118

Dear Mr. President (Prime Minister)",

Today, the final one was carried out in three capitals - Moscow, Washington and London

act in connection with the conclusion of the Treaty Banning Tests of Nuclear Weapons in the Atmosphere, in outer space and under water - instruments of ratification deposited

the original parties to this treaty are the Soviet Union and the United States

America and Great Britain.

Thus, the nuclear weapons test ban treaty has entered into force.

This is undoubtedly a significant event in international life that will bring joy to all nations.

Together with the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain

the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests has been signed by more than a hundred states.

It is safe to say that this agreement found a warm response and approval from everyone people of good will.

The governments of our countries have repeatedly noted that the prohibition treaty

the test is a document of great international significance, and was expressed

the hope that the conclusion of this treaty will have a positive impact

on the

international climate, on relations between states. Indeed, the conclusion

«On the first sheet below the main text is printed: «H.E

to Mr. John F. Kennedy, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

g. Washington

(HIS EXCELLENCY
mr Harold Macmillan,
PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN
g. London)».
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Signal instance

the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has breathed a fresh stream into the international one atmosphere, showing that, no matter how complex modern problems are, no matter how great the differences between the social systems of our states, we can find mutually acceptable ones solutions are in the interests of all humanity, in the interests of maintaining peace, if we show it the necessary desire for this.

But, of course, an agreement to ban experimental nuclear explosions for all its importance for peoples, it does not in itself solve the main international problem our era does not eliminate the danger of war. Now it's necessary, and they spoke in favor of it our governments must develop the success achieved further and look for solutions others urgent international issues.

These questions are well known, they are put forward by life itself, by all development world events. These include strengthening security in Europe, including liquidation remnants of the Second World War, conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO countries and the states party to the Warsaw Pact, the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons prohibition of the launch into orbit of objects with nuclear weapons on board, prevention measures surprise attack and a number of other steps. Their implementation would contribute significantly strengthening peace and improving international relations would clear the way for general and complete disarmament and, therefore, to freeing peoples from the threat of war. The people are waiting for our governments now to be even more assertive and consistency in their further actions in the interests of consolidating peace. What as for the Soviet government, it is invariably guided by Kursk to peace coexistence of states, it is ready to make new efforts, to do everything from it it depends on a shift for the better in the international environment, which it emerged as a result of the conclusion of an agreement banning nuclear weapons tests, and became the beginning of a sharp turn towards a broad détente in international tension. Allow me, Mr. President, to express the hope that the United States Government America, for its part, will make an appropriate contribution to solving international problems which the interests of weakening require international tension, interests ensuring universal peace.

Best Regards
N. KHRUSHCHEV
Moscow, Kremlin
October 10, 1963

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 350. L. 19 Copy (2 copies). Typewritten text. L. 20 - 21.
Original. Typewritten text.

Signal instance

NO. 9

Cipher telegram from the USSR Ambassador to the USA A.F. Dobrynin in the CPSU Central Committee about the course of the US Presidential Administration J.F. Kennedy on the relationship issue with the USSR after the signing of the Moscow Treaty

October 22, 1963a 50

Special. No. 1754 - 1765

g. Washington
SOV. SECRETLY

Ex. NO. 12

URGENTLY

Central Committee of the CPSU

Analysis of the Kennedy government's relationship course

with the USSR since the signing of the nuclear test ban treaty, which took place

exchange of views with US leaders, which was conducted by A.A. Gromyko

in New York and Washington on a wide range of issues', as well as embassy observations

the development of the internal political situation in the United States, in our opinion, allows us to express

some thoughts about the position of the Kennedy government, about our future

tactical and strategic line in the field of Soviet-American relations.

First. The development of our relations about the United States in the remaining period before and after the elections

the elections will largely depend on how the election struggle develops

in the USA, and who will be the next president in 1964. The main opponents of Kennedy

are Senator Goldwater and Rockefeller 2. In recent days, the figure has begun to appear

Nixon, who has far from given up hope of running for president again 3.

The main rival today is Goldwater, the mouthpiece of the most

the militant and reactionary circles of the United States that support and finance it.

If earlier the president's supporters predicted an easy victory over Goldwater,

if nominated by the Republican Party, now his inner circle

Kennedy, in private conversations, expresses some concern about quickly

the growing popularity of Goldwater. The latter is an experienced demagogue who plays for a few

simple and catchy slogans (for example, reducing government intervention

in Washington, D.C. to the affairs of the States (which resonate in various parts of the country, especially

among the broad sections of the population inexperienced in politics. Weak political

the consciousness of the masses in the United States remains an important factor that occurs here

* On the first page at the top, the stamp «vol. Khrushchev N.S.».

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Signal instance

consider - after all, in the last election, almost half of Americans voted for an explicit one

nixon reactionary.

Without creating great illusions about Kennedy himself, however, it is provided

there is no doubt that his re-election to US presidents for a new term would be for us

the most preferable option, because any possible presidential candidate from

republican Party (not to mention figures like Goldwater or Nixon), by force

at least the very logic of inter-party struggle in the US will inevitably emerge

in elections from a more right-wing position than Kennedy on issues of relations with the Soviet Union

Union.

An important point in this regard is both the point of view of characterizing the current line

kennedy government in matters of war and peace, and from the point of view of the famous

the binding influence of this moment on future government policy is already

kennedy's intention, which has now been sufficiently determined, to develop his own

election campaign under the slogan of maintaining peace and gradual normalization

international situation. Kennedy's line is to make the most

formed as a result of the Moscow Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

favorable situation for him in the country (as he was convinced of during a recent trip

for the 12 western states) in the interests of strengthening their position in the electoral

campaigns. Kennedy is interested in maintaining this favorable environment, although

further steps to ease international tensions should be taken

expect - taking into account, among other things, internal and inter-party struggle - that the current one

the administration will delay their discussion, or at least move forward very much

be careful.

An important factor for us in the question of the future president is the question

• Cuba, because any new president will not be bound in any way by the agreement between the heads

both governments, which was achieved during the Cuban crisis last October years. The personal relationships that have already developed between the chapters also have a certain significance
governments of the USSR and the USA.
Kennedy's position - in light of electoral factors - at present quite complicated. It is further aggravated by the fact that it is here now in general, there is an expansion of the front of the forces opposing it, connected primarily with the problem of civil rights of the black population of the country. The fact is that, having put forward under pressure from the rapid growth of the black movement, legislation is quite broad a program to ensure equal rights for blacks with whites,⁵⁴ Kennedy thereby he finally alienated the southern wing of the Democratic Party, and also turned it on some other segments of the population are against themselves, including among trade unions which, consisting mostly of white workers, for purely selfish reasons in reality

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Signal exemplar

they do not support the demands of blacks in matters of equal pay for work and living alone houses, etc., although sometimes they don't talk about it openly. The same segments of the population as Kennedy's position on civil rights issues is impressive, for the most part they supported Kennedy in the previous elections. Therefore, additional votes are due to this Kennedy may receive relatively few categories of voters.
At the same time, the government's desire to pass through Congress the specified the program is significantly reduced, due to the reciprocal opposition of members of Congress - southerners the odds of another major bill passing through Congress this year governments - on tax cuts,⁵⁵ the adoption of which would give Kennedy much more political dividends (Kennedy, as we know from his aides, plans conduct your election campaign under the slogan: «Peace and prosperity», and for the economic recovery in the country means tax cuts).
Kennedy also has tactical difficulties: while the Republicans they have not nominated a specific candidate; it is difficult for the president and his supporters to choose an effective tactical line for the election campaign, as it is now necessary diffuse attention on several candidates. The latter concentrate their criticism on one person - Kennedy. His assistant Bundy told me about this. In the end, though most observers continue to believe that victory will ultimately remain in favor Kennedy, at present, will stop more and more clearly - and, apparently, Kennedy himself is fine he understands this - that the struggle ahead of him will not be as easy as possible it was thought some time ago that he had reason to fear of all kinds surprises, especially if he makes some mistakes from a selective point of view strategies.
The main thing for Kennedy at this stage is to achieve re-election to the presidency. His steps in the field of external and internal will largely be subordinated to this politicians.
Second. In relation to issues of relations with the Soviet Union, the following is said the above, in our opinion, means that the Kennedy government is in the period leading up to the elections will follow approximately the following line.
On the one hand, it will seek to maintain the present some improvement in relations between the USA and the USSR and, if possible, prevent changes this election-friendly environment is for the worse. Moreover, it apparently will show a willingness to agree on a time-dispersed agreement separate, relatively less complex or, as they say here, «peripheral» issues, that the president is also useful domestically as proof that his policy in this regard is bearing fruit.

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Signal instance

But, on the other hand, the Kennedy government is unlikely to go to the end election campaign for any major steps in matters of relations about the USSR, especially those that would require discussion in the US Senate, and even more so his statements. Kennedy proceeds from the fact that the closer to the elections, the less he has a chance to get a majority of votes in the Senate because Republicans tactical considerations will not vote to support him. It must be emphasized that The US Congress as a whole still remains one of the main centers of anti-Sovietism mood in the country. From there, accusations against the government are mainly heard in «appeasing communism», and this kind of accusation the Kennedy administration seeks if possible, prevent or neutralize.

There is another important factor - the lack of consensus in the government regarding the Soviet Union in light of the Sino-Soviet disagreements 56.

o. According to available ones

this is unofficial; it continues to be stubborn in US government circles discussion on this issue. There are mainly three groups. The first consists of: Acheson, Minister of the Navy Nitze, Chief of the Air Force General Limey, the Bundy brothers (one - aide to the President, the other aide to McNamara), Jackson's powerful senators, the Russell and Dirksen (the first two deal with military issues in the Senate, the last - republican leader). This Pentagon-linked group believes the Sino-Soviet disagreements go deep into the past of these countries and are irreconcilable. Means a kind of «second front» has been created for the USSR, and this, they say, forces Moscow maneuver and avoid complications with the West. Hence the proposal: increase pressure on USSR and and try try to to force force it it to to make make concessions concessions in in Berlin, Berlin, for for example, example, using using the the this «show of force» on communications in West Berlin and on the borders of Germany with the GDR. The second group represents more US political rather than military circles. In her ruske, Ministers Hodges, Eudall, State Department leadership included: Ball, Harriman, Thompson, as well as Senator Fulbright. They believe that the Sino-Soviet differences, although and sharp, at the heart of their ideological order and may be at some point allowed between both parties, especially if the US puts strong pressure on USSR or China. Therefore, in their opinion, it is more expedient to continue, although without haste «policy of agreements» with the Soviet Union, to show it the prospects of the course towards development of diplomatic, cultural and other ties with the West. For these purposes, the group he also advocates a certain easing of restrictions on trade with the USSR. The third group, consisting of influential cabinet members, occupies an intermediate group position. It includes R. Kennedy, Secretary of War McNamara, and chief of associations staff General Taylor, Chief of Intelligence McCone. At present "Hereinafter underlined by the text of the document.

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Signal instance

time they are more inclined to the opinion of the second group, especially taking into account the electoral one campaigns, but in terms of their sympathies, some of them are rather on the side of the first group. Discussion on all these issues within the president's inner circle he cannot help but leave his mark on the behavior of the president himself, his policies which is characterized by certain zigzags, maneuvering, tribute to a point of view one group or another, although in general its line is now clearly closer to the second and third groups than to the first.

All of these factors outlined are reflected in Kennedy's current policies.

Hence, in conversations with Soviet representatives, the increased emphasis american government leaders think about what's going on for improvement american-soviet relations and solutions to major international problems should not be achieved hurry up, that you need to move in this direction step by step, thinking carefully and dispersing the steps taken over time, and also trying whenever possible give the agreements reached a form that does not require ratification

Third. In practical terms, if we analyze the position of Kennedy and Rusk during the exchange of views with A.A. Gromyko, US government to the end this year, in addition to the nuclear test ban treaty and agreement regarding the failure to launch weapons of mass destruction into Earth orbit! it's okay, it's necessary believe only in the signing of a consular convention^{®®} and a direct agreement with the USSR air traffic

As for other specific issues that were spent to one degree or another in conversations with American leaders, we can expect that the US government will be ready to return to discussing the issue of an attack pact between NATO and by the Warsaw Pact Organization sometime early next year after additional ones consultations with its allies, in particular during the December session of the NATO Council, taking into account our proposal to make a statement and text simultaneously with the conclusion of the pact which was reported to A.A. Thundercob!. In our opinion, on the issue of the pact we should and continue to put pressure on the Kennedy administration.

the agreement will not exclude the possibility of creating a multilateral nuclear force
NATO 2. American retreat from the principle of absolute exclusion of others
states are still the main thing in owning and disposing of nuclear weapons
the discrepancy between the positions of the USSR and the USA on this issue. Exchange of views on this
question, as well as on other issues related to multilateral rather than bilateral
relations, it has clearly shown that the Kennedy government is avoiding going yet
to such agreements with us as give rise to serious objections from them
NATO allies, primarily West Germany.

Kennedy realizes that the question of West Berlin continues to remain a very painful «callus» and therefore, presumably, it will be ready if it manifests itself we have a corresponding initiative to resume the exchange of views on this issue. However, however, however, however, however, however, it is very doubtful that he would resolve this issue on a mutually acceptable basis based on both foreign policy and domestic policy in the period before the elections reasons.

Fourth. Conversations of A.A. Gromyko with Kennedy and Rusk, in our opinion, is enough they also clearly showed the desire of American leaders to support and even develop, in a certain sense, the trusting nature of the exchange of views on a number of issues between the governments of both countries and especially their heads. It should be noted in this regard Kennedy's rather clearly revealed tendency towards a certain unspoken one agreements with N.S. Khrushchev, without a formal and especially public agreement

on the freezing of military budgets and some mutual reduction of troops in both German states.

Some of Rusk's very frank statements made by him are indicative in conversations with A.A. Gromyko (about West Germany, China, Japan, India), clearly designed for creating a certain atmosphere of some kind of trusting relationship. All this is especially clear apparently, if you remember that just a year ago, during the Cuban crisis³, the same American ones the leaders intensively played on the topic of the inability to trust the Soviet Union.

Of course, the behavior of both Kennedy and Rusk is not least explained by them the desire to maintain or even somewhat improve the current one is more favorable the atmosphere in Soviet-American relations, without any unexpected harshness

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Signal exemplar

deterioration, because such a turn of events during the election campaign could be worth it Kennedy, like Nixon in 1960⁶⁴

, the post of president and he undoubtedly takes this into account. What concerns Kennedy's emerging line on disarmament issues (to seek individual solutions problems on the ways of some actual containment of the arms race in certain areas), it is largely explained by growing financial difficulties of the United States itself.

Regardless of the motives, Kennedy's above trends objectively respond and our foreign policy goals and, as it seems to us, they should be use to the maximum extent possible. Useful in this sense were confidential Kennedy's statements on the issue of Soviet-American relations in broad terms and also a repetition of his assurance regarding Cuba.

Cuba, like West Berlin, remains one of the main, if not the most important, issues that currently have the greatest impact on our relations with the United States and are fraught the possibility of an unexpected flash. The question of Soviet military personnel is still on Cuba⁵ is one of Kennedy's most vulnerable points domestically.

If we add to this the possibility, in the near future, of travel by N.S. Khrushchev to Cuba, the prospect of which causes Kennedy clear concern, then all this is a certain instrument of influence in our hands on Kennedy, especially during the period election campaign, and the president understands this very well.

Analyzing all aspects of the foreign policy and domestic political situation USA, it cannot finally be ruled out that Kennedy will be ready to go to the summit if he considers it useful from the point of view of increasing his electoral chances.

And with the appointment of Hume as Prime Minister of England, who has established very good personal ones relations with Kennedy and Rusk, British pressure on the president in favor of such a meeting, at least within the framework of the Committee of 18, it will strengthen significantly.

Fifth. Taking into account all of the above, it seems appropriate on our part take the following steps:

(a) With a view to consolidating the positive results of A.A.'s conversations. Gromyko with Kennedy and Rusk and building, figuratively speaking, bridges for the future, send Kennedy on behalf of N.S. Khrushchev confidential message⁶, in which, after analyzing briefly the contents these conversations, note positive, from our point of view, points in position Americans, criticize provisions that are unacceptable to us and express our own considerations regarding further measures to normalize Soviet-American relations and settlement of international problems.

In this message, in particular, Kennedy should obviously be told that we took note of his promise to consult once again with US allies the question of a non-aggression pact and propose to begin to develop a specific form

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Signal instance

the said pact (at the same time it would be advisable to bring the text of our new one

a parallel statement that was communicated to A.A. Gromyko to the President, and to the attention of the British, so that they, in particular Hume, learn about him not only from the Americans).

The message could also note as a positive point that

which Kennedy said the US government still attaches great importance to

the problem of a German peace settlement and that he advocates continued efforts

aimed at resolving this problem. In this regard, express the wish that

the American side has specified its position in this regard (the Americans so far

they never disclose the nature «of temporary measures» in relation to West Berlin

which they talked about earlier, and the duration of the proposed arrangement). At the same time

as further evidence of the danger associated with the unresolved issue

with West Berlin, mention could be made of recent incidents along the access routes

to West Berlin,⁶⁸,

Overall, it seems that we should continue to put pressure on

The United States in these matters, in order, if possible, to clarify their position, their readiness to

some kind of agreement on West Berlin and push them towards such an agreement.

However, it is unlikely that there is any need to rush to discuss the procedure with them now

further exchange of views on these issues.

(b) Simultaneously, in the form of a separate oral message, Kennedy may

to be in general form for now, about our fundamental agreement with his idea that

some issues (such as freezing or reducing military budgets)

and troop reductions in Germany), on which the American side cannot yet conclude

formal agreements were exchanged between the governments of the USSR and the USA informally

order information about your «intentions».

It could also be made clear orally to Kennedy that we understand his difficulties

in connection with the election campaign, but at the same time we are not going to give it to him for this

a period of any indulgences in the event of those hostile to the Soviet Union, directed

against the reduction of international tension of actions or statements on his part. This is

the same applies to Cuba.

The message could be conveyed both through Thompson and directly

president (he practices informal meetings with ambassadors when it comes to

on confidential messages from other heads of government).

(c) We also consider it timely to organize N.S.'s speech now. Khrushchev

american television in order to bring American television to wide circles

the population has our point of view on the most important issues even before the height of the election

campaigns in the USA.

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(d) Develop now our pro minimum programme and maximum programme for the

conducting an informal exchange of views with the American side on issues

expansion of trade between the USSR and the USA[®], highlighting first of all the issues that

it would be possible to resolve without the sanction of Congress, and secondly, broader issues

(including the question of concluding a trade agreement, about loans, about settlements under Lend-Lease[®]),

the decision of which will require the US government to introduce certain provisions in Congress

legislative proposals.

(e) Consider a consolidated plan of activities in the field of relations with the United States, taking into account how

mentioned above, as well as possible other events, distributing all these events

in time, so as, on the one hand, not to create the impression of excessive haste

especially in view of the Kennedy government's position on timing, but on the other hand

and do not condone the Americans in making unjustified delays in resolving those issues

questions that are already ripe for this. Of course, it's the same for us at the same time

a principled line should be pursued towards decisive exposure of various

the machinations of US imperialist circles and the actions of the American government

aimed at continuing the arms race and preserving the international one

tension (as, for example, took place on the issue of NATO nuclear forces). Kennedy should continue to have no doubts about this.

In general, relations between the USSR and the USA are now going through, in our opinion, a new period. We have already confronted Kennedy with the need to take a defensive position in a number of ways questions, including on the issue of Cuba. Having been rebuffed by an attempt to intimidate us and tear us out concessions on the Cuban issue and making sure that such a path does not promise him success the President was forced to rebuild. Lately, after ours warnings, the US government, as far as can be judged, has taken action to the end of the bandit raids by the planes of the Cuban counter-revolutionaries'. Signing of the Moscow Treaty on the Cessation of Nuclear Tests and favorable the reaction of the American people to this, the strengthening of sentiment in the United States in favor of some kind the arrangements with the Soviet Union and the easing of international tensions are all forced Kennedy, who had long been at a crossroads, to make a choice in favor conducting your election campaign under the slogans of maintaining peace, from a position the advisability of finding an agreement with the Soviet Union on international issues problems, although this is sometimes accompanied by - paying tribute to those ingrained here sentiments - various reservations, as was the case, for example, in the latter speech by the President in Mein². In general, we can firmly say that all these positive factors are largely the result of the success of our offensive and an initiative foreign policy.

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Signal instance

Of course, draw firm conclusions about the stability of Kennedy's course towards the known one defusing international tensions and their duration is now impossible, given the situation in the United States is very difficult and the influence of the extremely reactionary ones that are intensifying here forces; Moreover, the danger of international complications associated with the presence has not been eliminated a number of unresolved problems and the ever-present threat of US intervention internal affairs of other countries, and especially in connection with American policy towards Cuba. Under the current conditions, we obviously shouldn't rush; it is advisable to carefully consider the next moves in order to continue the pressure and achieve for yourself, including using the specifics of the electoral situation in the United States more advantageous positions on issues that continue to matter. This, first of all, ensuring non-invasion of Cuba and normalizing the situation in West Berlin as part of the German peace settlement. Simultaneously - continue efforts on issues on which agreement has emerged during the course besedov A.A. Gromyko with American leaders.

A. DOBRYNIN

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 328. L. 13 - 30. Copy. Typewritten text on the form cipher telegrams of the 10th Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Ne 10

Note by First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.V. Kuznetsova about the draft information of the first secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist and Workers' Parties about the meetings of A.A. Gromyko with J.F. Kennedy, D. Rusk and A. Douglas-Home

NO. 3092/GC

23 October 1963 73

Secretly

Central Committee of the CPSU

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers it appropriate, as was done earlier, to inform in confidence and verbally to the first secretaries of the Communist Central Committee and the workers' parties of the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Mongolia

and Cuba about the main content of conversations between the USSR Foreign Minister and Kennedy and Rusk and Hume, which took place in New York and Washington in September-October this year.

Draft resolution attached 4.

Please consider.

IN. Kuznetsov

RGANI. F. 3. Op. 16. D. 354. L.144. Electrographic copy. Typewritten text.

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Signal exemilar

No. 11

Resolution of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee «On information from the first secretaries of the Central Committee

fraternal parties of the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Mongolia

and Cuba regarding the conversations of the USSR Foreign Minister vol. Gromyko A.A.

with US President Kennedy, US Secretary of State Rusk and Foreign Secretary

affairs of England by Hume in New York and Washington

No. 17120/XIII

25 October 1963 75

Approve the draft information of the first secretaries of the Central Committee of the fraternal parties of the GDR, Poland,

Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Mongolia and Cuba regarding the minister's conversations

foreign Affairs of the USSR t. Gromyko A.A. with US President Kennedy, US Secretary of State

Rusk and English Foreign Secretary Hume in New York and Washington.

(Appendix)

Secretly

BERLIN, WARSAW, PRAGUE, BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST?

SOFIA, ULAANBAATAR, HAVANA

co-ambassador

Visit t. Ulbricht (Gomulku, Novotny, Kadara, Deja, Zhivkova, Tsedenbala,

(Castro) and, citing instructions from the CPSU and the Soviet government, report orally

in confidence, the following information about conversations vol. Gromyko with Kennedy, Rusk

and Hume during his recent stints in New York and Washington.

Issues of German peace settlement and normalization of the situation

in West Berlin." During meetings with Kennedy, Rusk, and Hume, was confirmed

the previous position of the Soviet government on the issue of concluding a German peace treaty

treaty and normalization on its basis of the situation in West Berlin (liquidation)

occupation regime in West Berlin, replacement of the NATO flag with the UN flag,

the transformation of West Berlin into a free city, respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, etc)76.

Comrade. Gromyko insisted in conversations on a speedy solution to the German problem

peace settlement, emphasizing that to ensure lasting peace in Europe

the conclusion of the German peace treaty remains fully relevant. In conversation

with Kennedy t. Gromyko said that the Soviet government regrets that from the outside

the US government apparently does not understand the importance and urgency of the issue

on the conclusion of a German peace treaty from the point of view of European security

and ensuring world peace. Although the Soviet government does not give a time frame

«Hereinafter, underlines in the text of the document.

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Signal instance

the conclusion of the German peace treaty, however, it is convinced that the Western powers

we would make a mistake if they continued to endlessly delay the Resolution

together with the Soviet Union and other interested countries, the German cause

peaceful settlement.

The representatives of the United States and England stated that they recognized the paramount importance

solutions «to the German problem, and the Berlin question» to improve relations between

NATO countries and Warsaw Pact member states.

On a directly placed vol. Gromyko's question is whether it is correct to believe that the government The United States continues to attach great importance to the issue of a German peace settlement and that it advocates continued efforts to resolve this problem

Kennedy answered in the affirmative. However, the Americans believe that at present they do not a real opportunity to solve the German problem, although «time is working in favor of such a decision». Rask referred in particular to what has happened in the last two years certain changes that deprived the German problem of its former severity and tension.

From the conversations it became clear that the US government, declaring the impossibility of achieving now the solution to the German problem does not refuse to recognize that degree of agreement which was achieved on a number of issues related to the German peace settlement questions, and shows a readiness to create a more favorable general international situation, including further improvement of relations between the two german states and East and West in general. At the same time, Rask argued that the new German government will supposedly gradually implement a more conciliatory one politics will eventually go to socialist countries to create mixed ones technical commissions from representatives of Germany and the GDR and that all this will be dulled disagreements. Now the main question is how to prevent an exacerbation german problem and at the same time find ways to resolve other unresolved issues.

Hume repeated the previous proposal of the Western powers to instruct preparation of issues related to the German problem, including those related to german unification, deputy ministers, who would be given a deadline for this in a few months. Representatives could participate in the discussion of such issues both German states.

When discussing issues about West Berlin, Kennedy and Rusk still stated on the unacceptability for the United States of Soviet proposals regarding composition and timing the presence of foreign troops in West Berlin and in their statements proceeded from that the troops of the Western powers should remain in West Berlin until the final settlement of the German problem. Kennedy stated that one of the obstacles preventing an agreement on the German issue is the issue of change

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Signal zemilar

the composition of the troops located in West Berlin and the establishment of their deadline stay. Issues related to access to West Berlin and its status said

Kennedy, are also important, but subject to the issue of troops being resolved, these issues, of course could be solved.

In one of his conversations, Rusk, touching on the issue of West Berlin, expressed the idea that that we should agree on some «temporary measures». However, subsequently on comrade's request. Gromyko clarify what is meant by «temporary events»

Kennedy avoided clarifying this wording, and Rusk responded in general that all activities carried out in Germany in the post-war period should be considered as «temporary» until the final German settlement.

Issues of disarmament and limitation of the arms race. When exchanging views on these questions on our part were aimed at finding out whether anything had appeared new in the position of the Western powers on the issue of general and complete disarmament, as well identify the possibility of reaching agreements on individual measures that contributed to would strengthen peace and further mitigate international tensions emerging as a result of the conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests.

An exchange of views with representatives of the United States and England showed that the Americans and the British are still not ready to take radical steps in the field of disarmament they are not inclined to actually agree on general and complete disarmament. President Kennedy in a conversation on October 10, he even stated that he did not believe in the possibility of an agreement at all in the near future on this issue, but, nevertheless, believes that negotiations on

disarmament is useful and must be continued. Rusk and Hume, although they showed in conversations a certain interest in our new proposals in the field of general and complete disarmament (leaving a limited number of missiles at the disposal of the USSR and the USA with nuclear charges until the completion of the entire disarmament process), however, also enough they definitely made it clear that the United States and England do not mean to seek rapprochement now positions. To our proposal to convene a meeting of the participants of the Committee of 18 itself at a high level, representatives of the United States and England reacted with restraint, without rejecting it, but and without expressing a desire to implement this proposal. At the same time, from the conversations that took place, it follows that the leading figures of the United States, yes, and England is increasingly aware of the dangerous consequences it can lead to lead to an ongoing arms race. It felt like they were busy - and not least for financial reasons - looking for a way in a well-known one to limit the further arms race to ways acceptable to the West. In this regard, the statements of Kennedy and Rusk that At this stage, the United States considers it possible to seek solutions to individual disarmament issues not through formal agreements that would require a complex procedure

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Signal exemplar ratifications and could encounter difficulties in passing through the Senate, and by implementation by both sides of certain measures to limit the arms race unilaterally, in parallel, so to speak «looking at each other». When considering individual measures aimed at mitigating international tension, as is known, managed to reach an agreement on refusing to withdraw to orbit of objects with nuclear weapons on board. This arrangement, formalized unanimously adopted resolution of the UN General Assembly', which welcomes the the intention of the USA and the USSR «not to place any objects in outer space with nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction», has, as we we think it's a positive value. It represents a real step towards prevention the spread of the nuclear arms race into outer space. Entering an exchange of views on the issue of a non-aggression pact between NATO countries and our efforts were aimed at consolidating the Warsaw Pact a certain willingness to find a mutually acceptable solution to this issue has been shown representatives of the USA and England during conversations in Moscow in July-August of this year, and try go further towards reaching a concrete agreement. The representatives of the United States and England confirmed that they were generally positive they relate to the idea of a non-aggression pact, but they tried to put forward it, as before negotiations in Moscow, as a condition for concluding such a pact, an obligation with ours parties regarding the guarantee of freedom of access to West Berlin. Comrade. Gromyko, of course, he resolutely rejected these attempts by the Americans and British to demand from us as a price for the non-aggression pact, the abandonment of our principled position on the issue on the German peace settlement and normalization on its basis of the situation in the West Berlin. On our part, it was also emphasized that the Western powers should be neither in no way less interested than we are in the non-aggression pact. During further conversations, representatives of the United States and England no longer insisted on any or obligations «on freedom of access» to West Berlin in connection with the issue of the pact about non-aggression, but they spoke out in the sense that it would be good if Soviet The Union, when signing this pact, issued a parallel statement in which it indicated would that the situation in West Berlin can only be changed by agreement between USSR and Western powers. This formulation of the question was also assigned to vol. Gromyko, since it contradicts the agreed position of the socialist countries, how limiting our freedom of action on the issue of a peace treaty with the GDR. At the same time, President Kennedy was told that the Soviet government

it has invariably opposed and continues to oppose the use of force in resolving all controversial issues issues, including issues related to the German peace settlement and the normalization on its basis of the situation in West Berlin, and what the USSR could turn out to be

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forced to resort to force only in response to the use of force from one side or another against him or his friends and allies.

At the same time, it was emphasized that the Soviet government considers it necessary an early resolution of the issue of a peaceful settlement with Germany.

In addition, t. Gromyko emphasized that there will be a Soviet government adhere to the stated position if there is no invasion of Cuba. In case of invasion to Cuba we will fulfill our obligations to the Republic of Cuba. At the same time, to the president The United States was told that this statement regarding Cuba was being made in order to give the American government has a clear understanding of our position, and it not intended for publication.

Kennedy said that although France and Germany oppose the non-aggression pact, but now, in light of the considerations expressed by the Soviet government, the United States will discuss it again this question is with your allies.

In general, the exchange of views on the issue of a non-aggression pact resulted the impression is that there are opportunities to move forward in negotiations on the pact the non-aggression has not been exhausted and that it is advisable to continue to put pressure on the Americans and British.

President Kennedy said the US government was interested in what was put forward USSR proposal to reduce military budgets and that the USA, in any case they do not intend to increase their military budget for next year, or for the next period, unless there is any international crisis. At the same time Kennedy and Rusk argued that the conclusion of a formal reduction agreement military budgets could, they say, encounter a number of difficulties related, in particular with the problem of control, as well as with different budget structures. It would be better, he said Kennedy, agree to maintain military budgets at their current levels, but without formal agreement.

The issue of nuclear non-proliferation was discussed in detail weapons. On our part, the same line agreed between the socialist countries, which the Soviet Union occupied during the previous ones negotiations with the United States on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In accordance with this line t. Gromyko insisted that the nuclear non-proliferation agreement excluded the possibility not only of direct transfer of these weapons to non-nuclear powers, but and providing them with any indirect access to these weapons, including through the line military blocs. At the same time, on our part it was emphasized that although the positions of the USSR, the USA

and England seems to be close in the part that all three powers, in principle, believe it is desirable to reach an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, however The Soviet Union stands for preventing other states from acquiring nuclear weapons in any way form, including through various combinations along the line of blocks, by, for example

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